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Abstract 
 Safety is of critical importance in many industries, and the US Air Force is no 
exception.  Since 2005, the US Air Force has experienced more than 119 on-duty air and 
ground fatalities as well as 520 off-duty ground fatalities.  One of the more dangerous 
environments in the U.S. Air Force and the civilian industry is air transportation 
operations where the fatal injury rate is higher than the national average.  However, peer-
reviewed safety research focusing on air transportation operations is practically non-
existent, both in the military and civilian context.  Therefore, safety research that helps us 
better understand how to shape safety behaviors and predict or prevent mishaps must be 
undertaken.  Furthermore, the relationship between safety and operational outcomes is 
not fully understood, and research efforts to gain a better understanding of the inherent 
safety-operations tradeoff are long overdue. 
  To address these concerns, this dissertation 1) develops and validates an air 
transportation operations-specific safety climate scale capable of capturing organization 
and group-level safety climate, 2) investigates safety climate’s relationship with 
organizational citizenship behaviors and individual operational performance, and 3) 
examines the role a joint management system plays in translating safety climate into 
simultaneous increases in safety behaviors and individual operational performance. 
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DEVELOPMENT AND INVESTIGATION OF AN AIR TRANSPORTATION 
OPERATIONS SAFETY CLIMATE SCALE 
 
I.  Introduction 
Undeniably, safety is of critical importance in many industries, and the US Air 
Force is no exception.  Since 2005, the US Air Force has experienced more than 119 on-
duty air and ground fatalities as well as 520 off-duty ground fatalities (Air Force Safety 
Center, 2015; Headquarters U.S. Air Force, 2015).  One such instance occurred on 
February 17, 2013 when a US Air Force air transportation specialist lost his life in a 
workplace accident on Joint Base Andrews.  While backing up a vehicle, the vehicle 
operator lost sight of the air transportation specialist and pinned him between the vehicle 
and a warehouse wall, leading to his death (USAF Ground AIB Report, 2013).  The 
investigation concluded that improper spotting procedures were the primary cause of the 
accident, as the vehicle operator is required to stop the vehicle any time he or she loses 
sight of the spotter.  As described above, a lapse in following safety procedures can have 
catastrophic results; however, safety incidents can have harmful consequences in other 
ways as well.  In addition to loss of life, injuries can have a detrimental impact in the 
form of lost workdays.  From 1993–2002 alone, on-duty injuries resulted in more than 
3,300 lost workdays for Air Force active duty personnel (Copley et al., 2010).  One of the 
more dangerous environments in the U.S. Air Force is air transportation operations, 
where the fatal injury rate is higher than the national average for all industries (United 
States Department of Labor, 2004).  However, peer-reviewed safety research focusing on 
air transportation operations is practically non-existent, both in the military and civilian 
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context.  Therefore, safety research that helps us better understand how to shape safety 
behaviors and predict or prevent mishaps must be undertaken. 
 An important construct from the safety literature that has proven effective in 
predicting safety behaviors and safety incidents across a variety of industries is safety 
climate (de Koster et al., 2011; Kelloway et al., 2006; Podsakoff et al., 1990; Zohar, 
2010; Zohar & Luria, 2005).  Safety climate refers to the perceptions employees have of 
the importance their organization places on safety, and these perceptions help employees 
understand which types of behaviors are rewarded and supported in their organization 
(Zohar, 2010).  When an organization shuns safety procedures in favor of operational 
outcomes, this sends a signal to the employees that safe behaviors may not be as 
important to their organization.  However, when safety outcomes are rewarded over 
operational outcomes, employees get the sense that the organization cares about safety, 
and a higher level of safety climate is attained.  This potential conflict between safety 
procedures and operational objectives serves as the basis for the safety climate construct 
(Zohar, 2010).  Moreover, Zohar (2010) calls for industry-specific safety climate scales 
to be developed in order to uncover unique and context-specific factors that are important 
to developing a climate of safety for a respective industry.  To date, no safety climate 
scale has been developed for the air transportation operations industry.  Developing an air 
transportation operations safety climate scale may be pivotal to understanding what 
shapes the safety behaviors of the employees in this industry. 
 Furthermore, developing an air transportation operations safety climate scale may 
provide benefits above and beyond those in the safety realm.  Recent related research has 
uncovered that the inherent tradeoff between safety and operational outcomes may be 
15 
able to be overcome in certain situations (Pagell et al., 2015).  Instead of favoring 
operational outcomes over safety outcomes, or vice versa, creating a joint management 
system (JMS) that simultaneously measures, controls, and continuously improves both 
safety and operations may help balance the safety versus productivity tradeoff and lead to 
improved safety and operational outcomes (Pagell et al., 2015).  Additionally, creating a 
climate of safety may enhance employees’ sense of belonging to their organization and 
motivate them to engage in discretionary extra-role behaviors, namely organizational 
citizenship behaviors (OCBs), that enhance the functioning of the organization (Organ, 
1988).  By creating an air transportation operations safety climate scale and investigating 
its interactions with a JMS, this research may provide an avenue to influence employees 
to simultaneously work more safely and efficiently.  
1.1 Research Objective 
The objective of this research is to provide actionable safety-related intelligence 
to air transportation operations leaders that could enhance safety and operational 
performance of air transportation organizations.  Specifically, this research seeks to 1) 
create and validate an air transportation operations safety climate scale, 2) investigate 
safety climate’s relationship with organizational citizenship behaviors and individual 
operational performance, and 3) examine the role a JMS plays in the relationship between 
safety climate, safety behaviors, and individual operational performance. 
1.2 Research Contributions 
 With regards to the targeted research objectives, this dissertation provides the 
following contributions: 
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1. Develops and validates an air transportation operations-specific safety climate 
scale. A multi-level framework for safety climate is developed and validated 
using USAF air transportation specialists as a proxy.  Organization and group-
level safety climate constructs and their relevant sub-dimensions are identified.  
This safety climate measurement scale can serve as a leading indicator for safety 
mishaps in the air transportation operations industry, and the scale may 
differentiate low from high-performing organizations when it comes to creating a 
climate of safety.  This effort intends to extend safety climate theory to the high-
risk industry of air transportation operations and provides strong statistical 
support for level-adjusted safety climate scales.  For managers, this scale can help 
provide an in depth understanding of the impact an individual’s safety climate 
perceptions may have on his or her safety decision-making process.  It was 
discovered that not only is it important for first-line supervisors to display a 
sincere commitment to safety and enforce the organization’s safety policies, but 
organizational leaders must examine the formal safety policies to ensure the 
policies are straight-forward, non-contradictory, and help establish an 
environment that does not subjugate safety for performance.    
2. Investigates the effects of safety climate on OCBs and individual operational 
performance. This research advances the understanding of the role that safety 
climate may play on non-safety related outcomes in the form of OCBs and 
individual operational performance.  Theoretically, findings support that high 
levels of safety climate may increase an employee’s perceived organizational 
support and motivate an employee to engage in extra-role commitments that result 
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in increased operational performance.  This is the first known research effort to 
link a multi-level safety climate framework to operational performance through 
the mediating effects of OCBs. 
3. Empirically demonstrates the role a JMS plays in the relationship between safety 
climate, safety behaviors, and individual operational performance. Results of this 
research provide evidence that balancing the safety and operational performance 
tradeoff can result in simultaneous increases in safety behavior and operational 
performance of high-risk organizations.  This study is novel in that it incorporates 
employee perceptions of the existence of a JMS rather than relying on safety and 
operational manager’s inputs.  Additionally, this research demonstrates how 
safety climate theory and relational coordination theory can complement each 
other in relating safety climate to operational and safety outcomes.  Finally, 
managers can use employee perceptions of a JMS as a feedback mechanism to 
determine if a JMS has been effectively implemented in the organization.   
1.3 Overview and Organization 
The remainder of this dissertation follows a scholarly article format.  Chapters II-
IV are independent research articles on safety climate in the air transportation operations 
industry.  Each chapter is self-contained in that it contains its own introduction, 
conceptual development, methodology, analysis, and conclusion sections.  Additionally, 
each chapter contains its own future research recommendations. 
Chapter II develops an air transportation operations-specific safety climate scale 
and validates the scale with an independent sample.  This chapter introduces the reader to 
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the safety climate construct and provides an understanding of the important role safety 
climate can play in the air transportation operations environment.   
Chapter III utilizes the newly developed air transportation operations safety 
climate scale and investigates its relationship with OCBs and individual operational 
performance.  The intent of this chapter is to gain a better understanding of the 
relationship between safety and operational performance.  Results of the structural 
equation model analysis support the notion that safety climate may have effects far 
beyond safety outcomes.  
Chapter IV addresses the perceived tradeoff between safety performance and 
operational performance by investigating the role a JMS plays in the relationship between 
safety climate, safety behaviors, and operational performance in high-risk organizations.  
Structural equation modeling was used to analyze these relationships.  It was discovered 
that JMS moderates the relationship between group-level safety climate and operational 
performance.  Although safety climate was positively related to safety behaviors, safety 
climate was only positively related to operational performance when employees had high 
perceptions of the existence of a JMS.  Findings suggest that JMS may be a mechanism 
for translating safety climate into simultaneous increases in safety and operational 
performance in high-risk organizations. 
 The final chapter provides concluding remarks and summarizes the contributions 
made by each academic paper.  Finally, it closes with suggestions for future research. 
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II. Development and Validation of an Air Transportation Operations Safety Climate 
Scale 
2.1 Introduction 
On August 7, 1997 a Douglas DC-8-61 cargo aircraft crashed after takeoff in 
Miami, FL due to its center of gravity being altered.  The causal factor for this accident 
was misloaded cargo (NTSB, 2015).  Four crew members and a motorist on the ground 
were killed in this accident.  This accident prompted the NTSB to issue safety 
recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration to ensure all cargo operators 
and cargo handling personnel receive standardized instruction on aircraft loading 
procedures and that proper weight and balance documents were being used.   However, 
these safety recommendations alone were not enough to prevent similar accidents from 
taking place.  A Boeing 747-200 nearly crashed due to cargo breaking free during flight.  
This incident occurred in Lome, Togo, Africa on February 2, 2008 when an oil well drill 
broke free from its container and became lodged in the tail section of the aircraft.  The 
crew was able to make an emergency landing with no sustained injuries (NTSB, 2015).  
Finally, on April 29, 2013, seven crew members were killed when their Boeing 747-400 
aircraft crashed shortly after takeoff from Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan.  The National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) concluded that an improperly secured mine 
resistant, ambush protected all-terrain vehicle weighing more than 12 tons likely broke 
free from its tie-down straps and crashed into the tail section of the airplane, damaging 
critical hydraulic systems and ultimately rendering the aircraft uncontrollable (NTSB, 
2015).  Furthermore, the NTSB found that a lack of standardized cargo handling 
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procedures, training, and duty hour limitations for personnel who load and secure cargo 
as well as inadequate training and guidance for cargo handling inspectors contributed to 
this tragedy.  These incidents provide evidence that cargo handling and aircraft loading 
personnel have the potential to cause injuries and accidents to themselves and others if 
they improperly perform their jobs. 
2.1.1 Air Transportation Operations:  Unique Safety Challenges 
The United States Office of Personnel Management’s (1999) description of the 
aircraft freight loading occupation includes loading, securing, and unloading air cargo in 
the air terminal and on aircraft.  This occupation is encompassed in the 6900 series of job 
families, Warehousing and Stock Handling.  One of the gravest dangers faced by 
personnel in this industry is the operation of forklifts and aircraft loading equipment.  
Across all industries, nearly 100 workers are killed each year while operating forklifts 
and another 95,000 workers are injured (Lu & Yang, 2010).  Further hazards include 
operating on and around loading docks, failure to use proper personal protective 
equipment, and injuries from manual lifting (United States Department of Labor, 2004).  
These dangers are exacerbated when one considers that most of these actions take place 
on an aircraft flightline or inside tight quarters such as a warehouse.  In the United States 
Air Force (USAF), these duties are performed by air transportation specialists.  Duties of 
the air transportation specialist include planning, scheduling, and processing passengers 
and cargo for air movement, loading and unloading passengers and cargo, as well as 
operating forklifts and aircraft loading equipment (Department of the Air Force, 2012). 
The dangers of this profession were never more apparent than on February 17, 
2013 when a USAF air transportation specialist was killed in a workplace accident on 
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Joint Base Andrews.  According to the official investigation, two air transportation 
specialists were in the process of moving a piece of equipment into a warehouse storage 
location.  In order to accomplish this, three vehicles had to be moved.  One specialist 
operated the vehicles while the other specialist used spotting procedures to safely guide 
the vehicle operator.  While backing up the third vehicle, the vehicle operator lost sight of 
the other air transportation specialist and accidentally pinned him between the vehicle 
and the warehouse wall, leading to his death (USAF Ground AIB Report, 2013).  The 
investigation cited improper spotting procedures as a primary cause of the accident, as the 
vehicle operator is required to stop the vehicle any time he or she loses sight of the 
spotter. 
The importance of safety cannot be understated in any industry, and the air 
transportation operations industry is no different, as it is an industry with a fatal injury 
rate higher than the national average for all industries (United States Department of 
Labor, 2004).  However, peer-reviewed safety research centering on air transportation 
operations is practically non-existent.  Safety research in other industries has also 
historically been lacking, with less than 1% of organizational research published in top 
journals focusing on occupational safety (Barling et al., 2002; Neal & Griffin, 2006).  
When these articles did address occupational safety and the reduction of injuries, their 
focus was on accident prone individuals, personality traits, design of equipment, and 
regulatory systems (Barling et al., 2002).  However, Barling et al. (2002) informs us that 
occupational injuries might be reduced through a focus on safety-related events, which 
are a function of safety climate.  Safety climate refers to the shared perceptions that 
employees have of the value an organization places on safety versus other factors.  The 
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relationship between safety climate and safety-related outcomes is well documented, and 
research has shown that safety climate is a robust predictor of safety performance (de 
Koster et al., 2011; Kelloway et al., 2006; Podsakoff et al., 1990; Zohar, 2010; Zohar & 
Luria, 2005). 
2.1.2 Understanding Safety Climate 
 Dov Zohar launched safety climate research with his seminal article in 1980 
titled, “Safety climate in industrial organizations: Theoretical and applied implications” 
(Zohar, 1980).  In this article Zohar sought to describe a particular type of organizational 
climate, namely one for safety in industrial organizations.  Zohar keyed in on Schneider’s 
(1975) suggestion that organizational climate should be an area of research instead of a 
specific measure, and that organizational climate can be measured through the 
perceptions of employees.  Furthermore, Zohar asserted that employees’ shared 
perceptions and expectations drive their behaviors. 
Zohar (1980) performed an extensive literature review to develop the relevant 
dimensions of safety climate, keying in on organizational characteristics that differentiate 
high and low-accident rate companies.  The literature review resulted in the following 
dimensions of safety climate: management attitudes towards safety, effects of safe 
conduct on promotion, effects of safe conduct on social status, organizational status of 
the safety officer, importance and effectiveness of safety training, risk level at work 
place, and effectiveness of enforcement versus guidance in promoting safety.  A pilot 
sample of 120 production workers in four Israeli factories resulted in an eight-factor 
solution consisting of 40 items.  All eight dimensions were retained and labeled as:  
importance of safety training programs, management attitudes toward safety, effects of 
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safe conduct on promotion, level of risk at work place, effects of required work pace on 
safety, status of safety officer, effects of safe conduct on social status, and status of safety 
committee.  To test 1) if workers in different companies share common perceptions 
regarding safety in their respective organization, 2) if safety climate can vary from a less 
favorable to a more favorable one, and 3) if safety climate is correlated with a company’s 
safety record, Zohar surveyed 20 production workers from each of 20 factories.  Results 
of Zohar’s analysis confirmed that workers’ perceptions of their workplace safety were 
relatively homogenous within factories and distinctly different than workers’ perceptions 
in other factories.  This supported the existence of organizational safety climates.  
Furthermore, safety climate scores were found to vary from less favorable to more 
favorable, and the scores were related to the general safety level in the respective 
organizations.  Zohar found that the two most influential dimensions of safety climate 
were the perceived relevance of safety to job behavior (indicated by safety training and 
work pace) and management attitude toward safety (as shown by status of the safety 
officer and safety committee).  This article depicts the origin of the safety climate 
construct that has been heavily researched and refined by numerous researchers in 
subsequent years. 
One of the more noticeable refinements to the safety climate construct came from 
Zohar himself in 2000 when he empirically tested a group-level model of safety climate, 
a model that was distinct from the organization-level safety climate model.  This model 
measured perceptions of supervisory safety practices in work groups instead of the 
enforced company policies and procedures found at the organization-level.  Results from 
this study supported the predictive validity of the new group-level safety climate 
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measure, as the workgroup safety climate perceptions significantly predicted accident 
records during a 5-month follow-on period.  Zohar combined the group-level and 
organization-level safety climate constructs into an overarching multi-level safety climate 
model which depicted that enforced safety policies and supervisory safety practices 
simultaneously effect safety climate at the organization and group level, which in turn 
influences safety behaviors and safety outcomes (Zohar, 2003).  One of the major 
strengths of the safety climate concept is that it has been shown to be a robust predictor 
of safety outcomes across a wide variety of industries (Zohar, 2010).  Many researchers 
have used this construct and found that higher ratings of perceived safety climate result in 
a positive influence on safety behaviors and a decrease in safety incidents (Barling, et al., 
2002; Fogarty & Shaw, 2010; Griffin & Neal, 2000; Huang et al., 2007; Kelloway et al., 
2006; Zacharatos et al, 2005; Zohar, 2002; Zohar, 2003; Zohar & Luria, 2005; Zohar et 
al., 2014).  Although a consensus has been reached as to safety climate’s predictive 
ability on safety performance, there remain significant differences of opinion in how 
safety climate should be measured.  Specifically, differences exist as to whether safety 
climate should be measured at the individual unit of analysis, or if individual perceptions 
should be aggregated to the group or organizational level of analysis. 
The argument for aggregating individual safety climate perceptions to the work-
group or organizational unit of analysis is supported by Zohar (Zohar, 2002; Zohar & 
Luria, 2005; Zohar, 2008, Zohar, 2010).  Before addressing Zohar’s justification for this 
argument, it is first important to understand that organizational climate has long been 
conceptualized as an aggregated psychological climate (Baer & Frese, 2003).  Baer and 
Frese (2003) highlight previous research by James et al. (1988) and argue that 
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psychological climate is a set of perceptions reflecting how facets of the environment are 
cognitively appraised and hold meaning for individuals.  When people inside an 
organization share similar perceptions, these perceptions should be aggregated in order to 
form indicators of an organizational climate.  Zohar and Luria (2005) built on this 
concept and applied it specifically to the multi-level construct of safety climate consisting 
of an organization-level and group-level climate.  Zohar and Luria (2005) argue that 
convergent measures of employees’ perceptions should be aggregated to the unit of 
analysis of theoretical interest, namely the organization and sub-groups within the 
organization.  This is because in the multi-level safety climate model, top management is 
concerned with making and enforcing policies and procedures, whereas group-level 
supervisors are tasked with executing those procedures.  This gives rise to the possibility 
of employees forming sub-climates within an organization. 
To understand why this can happen, Zohar (2008) lists three assumptions that 
have to be made.  First, since policies and procedures established by top management are 
enacted by group-level supervisors, there is a potential for a discrepancy between formal 
and executed policy.  Second, supervisors have discretion when it comes to implementing 
these policies during day-to-day activities.  This discretion arises due to the fact that 
procedures cannot cover every situation that will be encountered, and supervisors must 
make choices as to how they will react to new situations or situations that have 
conflicting guidance.  Individual differences between group-level supervisors can lead to 
different actions when it comes to implementing the top-level policies, which can result 
in between-group variation within the same organization.  Finally, Zohar (2008) states 
that employees must be able to differentiate between procedures instituted by top 
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management and procedures executed by group-level supervisors.  Essentially, distinct 
organization-level and group-level safety climates are likely to be formed.  This is the 
driving force behind aggregating individual-level perceptions of safety climate to the 
group and organization level.  Research results indicate that organization-level and 
group-level safety climates are aligned and that group-level safety climate may mediate 
the relationship between organization-level safety climate and safety related outcomes 
(Zohar & Luria, 2005).  Thus, by aggregating individual-level perceptions of safety 
climate to the group and organization-level, true shared perceptions can be assessed, sub-
climates can be identified, and the effects of these levels of safety climate can be 
investigated. 
2.1.3 Purpose 
 Air transportation operations safety research is currently unexplored territory.  
Although much research has been done areas such as warehouse safety and transportation 
safety, no research articles have been found that address air transportation operations 
safety.  Additionally, there is no published research on safety in USAF air transportation 
operations.  Although consensus has been reached as to safety climate’s relationship with 
safety performance, Zohar (2010) stresses the need for creating industry-specific safety 
climate scales in order to capture context-dependent perceptions of safety climate.  
Generic safety climate scales should not be used because factors that are important for 
safety in one industry, such as nursing, may be completely different from factors in other 
industries such as air transportation operations.  Although safety in air transportation 
operations is of critical importance, no air transportation operations-specific safety 
climate scale has been developed.  Therefore, the purpose of this research is to develop 
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an air transportation operations-specific safety climate scale, using the USAF air 
transportation specialist as a proxy, and lay the foundation for future safety research in 
this industry. 
2.1.4 Present Study 
 An exploratory sequential mixed methods research design in three phases was 
used to develop the air transportation operations safety climate scales.  A qualitative 
inquiry was performed first, and Creswell’s (2014) six-step process for qualitative data 
analysis was used to guide this inquiry.  This consisted of a review of the relevant 
literature, semi-structured interviews, and site visits to gather raw data.  Once completed, 
interviews were transcribed and coded to uncover relevant safety climate themes.  These 
themes were interpreted and used to develop a series of survey instruments.  Air 
transportation specialists residing in USAF organizations were the target participants for 
this research effort.  This research and research procedures were reviewed and approved 
by an Institutional Review Board and the Air Force Survey Control Office.  In the first 
study, 4 site visits and 23 semi-structured interviews were conducted and analyzed to 
develop an initial set of 62 items for organization safety climate and 76 items for group 
safety climate.  In the second study, the safety climate scales were further reduced to 14 
items for organizational safety climate and 10 items for group safety climate by analyzing 
the inter-item correlations and performing an exploratory factor analysis.  Finally, a third 
study was conducted using confirmatory factor analysis and inter-item correlations to 
validate the proposed air transportation operations safety climate scales (Campbell & 
Fiske, 1959; Hinkin, 1998; Schwab, 1980). 
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2.2 Study 1: Instrument Development 
2.2.1 Phase 1: Item Generation 
 Phase 1 was conducted to generate an initial pool of organization and group safety 
climate measurement scale items relevant to the air transportation operations domain.  
The scale items were developed through a combination of an extensive literature review, 
site visits, and semi-structured interviews.  Previous research and theory were first 
examined to identify potential dimensions of safety climate for the air transportation 
operations environment.  This review resulted in 10 possible safety climate dimensions 
and served as the basis for the interview protocol.  The start list for safety climate 
dimensions can be found in Appendix A.1, and the interview protocol can be found in 
Appendix A.2.   
Procedure.  A total of 23 air transportation operations subject matter experts were 
interviewed from 3 large USAF aerial port squadrons (APS): two east coast APS (n = 6; 
n = 8) and one west coast APS (n = 9).  Informed consent was received from each 
interviewee, and all interviews were recorded.  Interviewees included organization 
leaders, first-line supervisors, safety managers, and line workers.  Each interviewee was 
asked to provide information regarding safety-related decisions they make, disconnects 
encountered between making safe decisions and performing operational tasks, 
consequences of making safe or unsafe decisions, safety policies that help or hurt one’s 
ability to make safe decisions, supervisor and leadership practices regarding safe 
behavior, etc.  Once data saturation was reached, no additional interviews were 
conducted (Miles et al., 2014).  The interviews were then transcribed using a professional 
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transcription service and analyzed to identify the dimensions of safety climate for air 
transportation operations.   
Analysis of the interviews was conducted in two cycles.  For the first cycle, 
provisional coding was selected and began with the predetermined start list of 10 
potential safety climate dimensions.  The provisional list was generated from the 
literature review, safety climate theory, and field notes from the site visits.  Elaborative 
coding was used for the second cycle.  In elaborative coding, the goal is to refine 
theoretical constructs from previous studies (Saldaña, 2012).  The analysis resulted in 
multi-dimensional organization and group safety climate constructs.  For organization 
safety climate, the potential sub-dimensions were management commitment to safety, 
safety policies and procedures, safety training, and vehicles and equipment.  For group 
safety climate, the potential sub-dimensions identified were management commitment to 
safety, work pressure, safety briefings, safety communication, and coworker support.  
Coded text from each dimension and previous safety climate measurement scales were 
then used to develop a pool of 138 potential scale items.  After eliminating redundant 
items, 107 scale items survived.  This resulted in a total of 49 items for organization 
safety climate:  21 items for management commitment to safety, 9 items for safety 
policies and procedures, 9 items for safety training, and 10 items for vehicles and 
equipment.  A total of 58 items remained for group safety climate:  24 items for 
management commitment to safety, 10 items for work pressure, 6 items for safety 
briefings, 7 items for safety communication, and 11 items for coworker support. 
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2.2.2 Phase 2: Item Review 
Sample.  The 107 scale items were reviewed by 13 judges with varying 
backgrounds but related areas of expertise including aircraft maintenance, logistics 
readiness, cargo movement, passenger movement, and air transportation operations 
safety.  This review served two purposes: 1) maximize content validity of the scale and 2) 
evaluate the items’ clarity and conciseness (DeVellis, 2010). Three of the judges were 
professors with doctoral degrees related to logistics and supply chain management, two 
of the judges were doctoral candidates in a logistics program, and one of the judges was a 
master’s student in logistics and supply chain management.  The remaining judges were 
practicing managers of different levels in air transportation operations. 
 Procedure.  A preliminary survey was sent to each judge to review.  The survey 
included each safety climate scale item organized by construct and dimension (e.g., 
organization safety climate – management commitment to safety).  The judges were 
instructed to provide feedback on whether the questions were clear, whether the questions 
were reflective of the dimensions they were intended to measure, and whether the 
questions were relevant to air transportation operations.  As a result of the feedback, 34 
items were removed.  These items were removed due to several factors: 1) repetitiveness, 
2) difficult to understand, 3) and not relevant.  The 31 remaining scale items for 
organization safety climate consisted of:  11 items for management commitment to 
safety, 6 items for safety policies and procedures, 7 items for safety training, and 7 items 
for vehicles and equipment.  The 42 remaining scale items for group safety climate were 
broken down as:  12 items for management commitment to safety, 7 items for work 
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pressure, 5 items for safety communication, 10 items for safety briefings, and 8 items for 
coworker support. 
2.3 Study 2:  Instrument Refinement – Pilot Survey 
 Sample. Invitations went out to 723 air transportation specialists from three large 
continental USAF APS’s to participate in the pilot survey.  A total of 168 responses were 
received (response rate of 23.2%).  The average age of the respondents was 28.7 years 
(SD = 6.8) and the average years of work experience was 10.1 years (SD = 8.9).  To 
assess the characteristics of the sample relative to the population, a comparison was made 
with regards to rank and age distribution (see Table 1).  A difference of proportions test 
was conducted, and no significant difference was found between the sample and 
population rank proportions.  Because the responses by rank and age compare favorably 
to that of the air transportation specialist population, it was concluded that a 
representative sample was achieved. 
Table 1: USAF air transportation specialist sample and population comparison 
 Population Sample 
# 4530 168 
Age 27.6 28.7 
SD 6.4 6.8 
  Population Sample 
E-1 0.6% 0.9% 
E-2 3.1% 2.6% 
E-3 24.7% 18.8% 
E-4 22.9% 23.9% 
E-5 25.6% 24.8% 
E-6 13.8% 17.1% 
E-7 7.4% 8.5% 
E-8 1.3% 2.6% 
E-9 0.7% 0.9% 
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Procedure. The pilot survey was composed of the 31-item organization safety 
climate scale, the 42-item group safety climate scale, and demographic questions.  For the 
safety climate scales, respondents were asked to indicate on a 7-point Likert scale the 
extent to which they agreed or disagreed with the statements.  This scale was anchored at 
1 (strongly disagree) and 7 (strongly agree). 
All air transportation specialists assigned to the three APSs involved in this study 
were invited to participate in this survey on a voluntary and confidential basis.  Each air 
transportation specialist was sent an introductory email explaining the research, and that 
email was followed up with an official survey invitation email that included a web link to 
the online survey.  A reminder email was sent out one week after the official survey 
invitation email, and a final email was sent one week later in accordance with accepted 
survey protocol (Fink, 2012; Neuman, 2011; Salant & Dillman, 1994).  No individual 
identifier was collected for this study to help provide anonymity to respondents.  It has 
been shown that anonymous surveys aid in lowering social desirability bias (Joinson, 
1999).  The average time of completion of the survey was approximately 25 minutes.  
Furthermore, each respondent had the opportunity to be entered into a drawing for a $50 
gift card upon completion of the survey.  Although 168 responses were received, any 
survey with more than 50% missing values in either of the safety climate scales were 
excluded from the analysis.  This resulted in a final sample of 165 responses for 
organization safety climate (22.8% response rate) and 150 responses for group safety 
climate (21.4% response rate).  A non-response bias test was conducted to compare 
responses of early and late respondents.  Groups were separated into those that responded 
to the first email versus those that responded to follow-up emails.  A t-test analysis was 
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used to determine if there were statistically significant differences between responses of 
the two groups.  Results showed that there was a significant difference in responses for 
three of the 73 variables (GSB5, p = .016; GSB6, p = .004; GCS7, p = .022) for early 
versus late respondents.  Based on the above results, it was concluded that non-response 
bias was not a major concern in this study.   
2.3.1 Phase 1:  Item Selection Process 
 Prior to conducting the factor analysis, interitem correlations of the safety climate 
scale items were examined and problem variables were removed (Hinkin, 1998).  
Measurement scales should be comprised of highly correlated items because low 
correlations indicate items may not be measuring the same construct (Churchill, 1979; 
DeVellis, 2010).  Therefore, any organization safety climate item that correlated less than 
0.4 with all other organization safety climate scale items was deleted from the analysis 
(Kim & Mueller, 1978).  The same procedure was used for the group safety climate scale 
items.  This process resulted in the removal of 6 organization safety climate scale items 
and 4 group safety climate items, leaving 25 and 38 items per scale, respectively. 
2.3.2 Phase 2:  Preliminary Factor Analysis 
 Because of the exploratory nature of this study, and because safety climate theory 
suggests organization safety climate, group safety climate, and their sub-dimensions are 
related, principle axis factoring with an oblique rotation was used (Fabrigar et al., 1999).  
Furthermore, because organization safety climate and group safety climate are expected 
to be related, a separate factor analysis was performed for each construct.  The 
exploratory factor analysis was used as an item-reduction technique and to address the 
dimensionality of the organization and group-level safety climate scales.  Rules used for 
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the factor analysis were:  factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 were retained, items 
with loadings less than 0.40 or cross-loadings within 0.20 of a significant loading were 
removed from the analysis, and items with communalities less than 0.50 were removed 
from the analysis (Hinkin, 1998).  This process was repeated until a clear factor structure 
matrix was obtained.  The factor loadings, eigenvalues for the factors, percentage of 
explained variance by the factors, and internal reliability statistics are shown in Tables 2 
and 3.  This process resulted in a 14-item, four-factor solution for organization safety 
climate (management commitment to safety, safety policies and procedures, safety 
training, and vehicles and equipment).  A 10-item, three-factor solution was obtained for 
group safety climate (commitment and support, work pressure, and safety briefings).  A 
list of the organization and group-level safety climate items can be found in Appendix 
A.3.  All factors for organization and group safety climate’s displayed adequate internal 
reliability with Cronbach’s α scores above 0.7 (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). 
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Table 2: EFA results for organization-level safety climate scale 
  Factor 
  F1 F2 F3 F4 
F1: Safety training (CA = 0.885)    
 
OT1 0.87 - - - 
OT2 0.73 - - - 
OT3 0.65 - - - 
OT4 0.74 - - - 
OT5 0.72 - - - 
     
F2: Management commitment to safety (CA = 0.875)     
OMC1 - 0.73 - - 
OMC2 - 0.94 - - 
OMC3 - 0.78 - - 
     
F3: Vehicles and Equipment (CA = 0.859)     
OVE1 - - 0.86 - 
OVE2 - - 0.55 - 
OVE3 - - 0.75 - 
     
F4: Safety policies and procedures (CA = 0.815)     
OSP1 - - - 0.72 
OSP2 - - - 0.84 
OSP3 - - - 0.66 
     
Eigenvalues 6.84 1.54 1.25 1.01 
Percentage Variance 48.83 10.97 8.95 7.18 
Cumulative Variance 48.83 59.80 68.74 75.92 
     
Notes. Numbers in boldface indicate dominant factor loadings.  
Only factor loadings over .3 are shown. 
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Table 3: EFA results for group-level safety climate scale 
  Factor 
  F1 F2 F3 
F1: Commitment and support (CA = 0.886)    
GMCS1 0.80 - - 
GMCS2 0.77 - - 
GMCS3 0.79 - - 
GMCS4 0.80 - - 
    
F2: Work pressure (CA = 0.815)    
GWP1 - 0.90 - 
GWP2 - 0.76 - 
GWP3 - 0.61 - 
    
F3: Safety briefings (CA = 0.868)    
GSB1 - - 0.79 
GSB2 - - 0.80 
GSB3 - - 0.78 
    
Eigenvalues 5.12 1.53 1.00 
Percentage Variance 51.24 15.31 10.00 
Cumulative Variance 51.24 66.55 76.55 
Notes. Numbers in boldface indicate dominant factor loadings.  
Only factor loadings above .3 are shown 
 
2.4 Study 3: Instrument Validation – Validation Survey 
 Sample. To validate the new safety climate scales, we invoked an independent 
sample from 19 USAF organizations.  These organizations consisted of five continental 
United States (CONUS) and six overseas USAF APS’s, as well as eight CONUS USAF 
logistics readiness squadrons (LRS) in which air transportation specialists are employed.  
None of the organizations in the pilot study were included in the validation study.  In 
total 1,733 air transportation specialists were invited to participate in the web based 
survey, and 260 responses were received (15.0% response rate).  The average age of the 
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respondents was 28.7 years (SD = 6.3), and the average years of work experience was 
10.98 years (SD = 8.07).  To assess the characteristics of the sample relative to the 
population, a comparison was made with regards to rank and age distribution (see Table 
4).  The sample was overrepresented by air transportation specialists in the non-
commissioned officer (NCO) ranks of E-5 through E-6, and underrepresented in the 
Airman (Amn) ranks of E-1 through E-4.  One possible explanation for this could be due 
to only including operational organizations in this study.  The air transportation specialist 
technical training school was not included in the survey sample.  All new air 
transportation specialists attend this training school, and it consists of primarily personnel 
in the Amn ranks.  Because of the difference between sample and population respondent 
rank, caution should be used when generalizing findings of this study beyond the current 
sample. 
Table 4: USAF air transportation specialist sample and population comparison 
 Population Sample 
# 4,530 260 
Age 27.6 28.8 
SD 6.4 6.0 
  Population Sample 
E-1 0.6% 1.1% 
E-2 3.1% 1.1% 
E-3 24.7% 15.5% 
E-4 22.9% 18.7% 
E-5 25.6% 33.7% 
E-6 13.8% 19.8% 
E-7 7.4% 9.6% 
E-8 1.3% 0.5% 
E-9 0.7% 0.0% 
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A non-response bias test was conducted to compare responses of early and late 
respondents.  Groups were separated into those that responded to the first email versus 
those that responded to follow-up emails.  A t-test analysis was used to determine if there 
were statistically significant differences between responses of the two groups.  Results 
showed that there was a significant difference in responses of to three variables (GSB1, p 
= .016; GSB2, p = .004; GMCS4, p = .022) for early versus late respondents.  Based on 
the above results, it was concluded that non-response bias was not a major concern in this 
study.   
Procedure. All air transportation specialists included in this study were invited to 
participate in this survey on a voluntary and confidential basis.  The same procedures 
used in the pilot study were once again used for the validation study.  Each air 
transportation specialist was sent an introductory email explaining the research, and that 
email was followed up with an official survey invitation email that included a web link to 
the online survey.  A reminder email was sent out one week after the official survey 
invitation email, and a final email was sent one week later in accordance with accepted 
survey protocol (Fink, 2012; Neuman, 2011; Salant & Dillman, 1994).  No individual 
identifiers were collected for this study.  The average time of completion of the survey 
was approximately 21 minutes.  Furthermore, each respondent had the opportunity to be 
entered into a drawing for a $50 gift card upon completion of the survey.  Although 260 
responses were received, 13 responses were deleted due to unengaged respondents.  The 
unengaged respondents were identified due to answering all Likert questions as a “7”.  
No issues were found with missing responses in this study.  This resulted in a final 
sample of 247 responses (14.3% response rate).  A non-response bias test was conducted 
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to compare responses of early and late respondents and APS versus LRS respondents.  
Once again, groups were separated into early and last responders based on those that 
responded to the first email versus those that responded to follow-up emails.  Independent 
sample t-tests were performed to determine if significant differences existed between the 
two groups.  The type I error rate was set to .05 for this analysis.  For the early versus late 
respondents, results showed that there was a significant difference in responses for only 
one variable (OVE2, p = .009).  When comparing APS responses to LRS responses, a 
significant difference was found between three variables (OT6, p = .040; OVE2, p = 
.020; SB5, p = .044).  Based on the above results, it was determined that non-response 
bias was not a significant concern in this study. 
The survey was composed of the 15-item organization safety climate scale, the 
10-item group safety climate scale, a 5-item self-reported safety behavior scale (Mearns 
et al., 2003; Mearns et al., 2010; Rundmo, 1996; Rundmo, 2000), two questions 
addressing the frequency of injuries (Goldenhar et al., 2003; Iverson & Erwin, 1997), and 
demographic questions.  Although the pilot study resulted in a 14 item organization 
safety climate scale, one of the items was found to be a double barreled question.  This 
item, OT1, was divided into two questions (see Appendix A.3) which resulted in the 15-
item organizational safety climate scale.  For the safety climate and safety behavior 
scales, respondents were asked to indicate on a 7-point Likert scale the extent to which 
they agreed or disagreed with the statements.  These scales were anchored at 1 (strongly 
disagree) and 7 (strongly agree).  For the frequency of injuries, respondents were asked to 
indicate how many times a major body part (e.g., head, neck, eyes, shoulder, arms, wrist, 
hand, back, legs, ankles, feet) was injured over the past year.  The responses for injuries 
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were then trichotomized into: none, one, or two or more.  This method of grouping self-
reported injury has been used in previous studies that model direct relationships between 
predictor variables and injury outcomes (Goldenhar et al., 2003; Iverson & Erwin, 1997). 
To validate the safety climate measurement scales, several approaches were used.  
First, a series of confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) were performed to assure factor 
structure validity of the newly developed safety climate scales.  Separate CFAs were 
performed and interpreted for both the pilot survey and validation survey data.  In 
addition to the χ2 test statistic, the quality of model fit was assessed using the 
standardized root mean square residual (SRMR), comparative fit index (CFI), goodness 
of fit index (GFI), normed fit index (NFI), and root mean square error of approximation 
(RMSEA).  For CFI, .95 or greater is evidence of approximate fit (Bentler & Bonnet, 
1980; Hu & Bentler, 1999).  For GFI and NFI, .90 or greater is evidence of approximate 
fit (Bentler & Bonnet, 1980; Joreskog & Sorbom, 1982; Kline, 2011).  An SRMR under 
.08 signifies an acceptable fit (Hooper et al., 2008; Kline, 2011).  Finally, an RMSEA < 
.05 is evidence of a good model fit; .05 < RMSEA < .08 indicates a reasonable model fit; 
and an RMSEA > .10 indicates a poor model fit (Browne & Cudeck, 1993; Hair et al., 
2010).  Next, discriminant validity is demonstrated performing the Fornell and Larcker 
(1981) test.  Finally, criterion-related validity is analyzed by assessing the safety climate 
scales’ relationship with its theoretical effects of safety behaviors and workplace injuries. 
2.4.1 Phase 1:  Dimensionality 
 A series of CFAs via AMOS 18 using maximum likelihood estimation was 
performed to cross-validate the organization and group-level safety climate scales that 
were obtained through the pilot study EFA.  Separate CFAs were performed on the pilot 
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study data (n = 165 for organization-level safety climate; n = 150 for group-level safety 
climate) and on the validation study data (n = 247 for both organization and group-level 
safety climate).  For both the pilot study data and validation data, three models were 
assessed with each level of safety climate, and the results are displayed in Table 5.  First, 
a correlated four-factor organization-level safety climate model (and three-factor group-
level safety climate model) based off the pilot study EFA was assessed.  Next, a one-
factor, unidimensional model was assessed for both the organization and group-level 
safety climate scales to determine if single latent variables would be best in analyzing the 
new safety climate scales.  Finally, 2nd order hierarchical models were assessed in which 
the factors found during the pilot study EFAs were modeled as indicators for the higher-
order safety climate scales. 
 For organization-level safety climate, all three models fit the data reasonably well 
with GFIs and NFIs near or above the .90 threshold, CFIs near or above the 0.95 
threshold, SRMRs under .08, and RMSEAs showing good or reasonable model fit.  
However, the 2nd order hierarchical model consistently had the better model fit across all 
fit indices, while the unidimensional model failed to meet the minimum fit indices 
threshold for GFI and CFI.  For group-level safety climate, once again all three models fit 
the data reasonably well with GFIs and NFIs well above the .90 threshold, CFIs well 
above the .95 threshold, and SRMRs well below acceptable levels of fit thresholds.  Once 
again, the 2nd order hierarchical model consistently displayed the best model fit (χ2 = 
41.20, df = 30, p-value = .08; GFI = .97; CFI = .99; NFI = .97; SRMR = .04; RMSEA = 
.04, 90% CI (.00, .07)).  These findings were consistent across both the pilot and 
validation studies.  Based both on the results of the CFAs and the theoretical 
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underpinnings that safety climate should be represented by various sub-dimensions, the 
2nd order hierarchical model was deemed to be most appropriate for capturing the air 
transportation safety climate scales, similar to findings by Huang et al. (2013).  These 
findings offer support for the construct validity and dimensionality of the safety climate 
scales created during the pilot study.  Models of the organization and group-level safety 
climate scales are shown in Figures 1 and 2. 
 
 
Figure 1. Organization-level safety climate dimensions and indicators 
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Figure 2. Group-level safety climate dimensions and indicators 
Table 5: CFA results for organization and group-level safety climate 
Models Fit indexes 
  Χ2 (df)   
P CMIN 
/DF   
p-
value   GFI   CFI   NFI   SRMR   
RMSEA (90% 
CI) 
A. Org-level safety climate                
Pilot study (n = 165)                
  Model 1:  Four-factor 139.44 (71)  1.96  ***  .89  .95  .91  .053  .08 (.06, .10) 
  Model 2:  Single-factor 157.54 (67)  2.35  ***  .88  .93  .89  .069  .09 (.07, .11) 
  Model 3:  2nd order hierarchical 128.84 (72)  1.79  ***  .90  .96  .91  .054  .07 (.05, .09) 
                
Validation study (n = 247)                
  Model 1:  Four-factor 198.78 (82)  2.62  ***  .90  .95  .91  .06  .08 (.06, .09) 
  Model 2:  Single-factor 229.94 (83)  2.77  ***  .88  .93  .90  .06  .09 (.07, .10) 
  Model 3:  2nd order hierarchical 194.77 (83)  2.347  ***  .90  .95  .92  .06  .07 (.06, .09) 
                
B. Grp-level safety climate                
Pilot study (n = 150)                
  Model 1:  Three-factor 59.05 (31)  1.91  ***  .93  .97  .94  .05  .08 (.05, .11) 
  Model 2:  Single-factor 43.33 (26)  1.74  .01  .94  .98  .95  .04  .07 (.03, .10) 
  Model 3:  2nd order hierarchical 55.64 (30)  1.86  ***  .94  .97  .94  .04  .08 (.04, .11) 
                
Validation study (n = 247)                
  Model 1:  Three-factor 41.20 (30)  1.37  .08  .97  .99  .97  .04  .04 (.00, .07) 
  Model 2:  Single-factor 55.75 (29)  1.92  .02  .96  .98  .95  .04  .06 (.04, .09) 
  Model 3:  2nd order hierarchical 41.20 (30)   1.37   .08   .97   .99   .97   .04   .04 (.00, .07) 
Note: *** p < .001 
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2.4.2 Phase 2:  Criterion-Related and Discriminant Validity Assessment 
 Criterion-related validity, the extent to which a measure correlates with another 
theoretically related measure, was examined by investigating the correlations between the 
air transportation operations safety climate scales and self-reported safety behaviors and 
self-reported injuries (Leedy & Ormrod, 2014).  Safety research has shown that safety 
climate is an antecedent of safety performance across a wide range of industries and has 
been implicated as a key factor in promotion of injury-reducing behavior (Barling et al., 
2002; Fogarty & Shaw, 2010; Griffin & Neal, 2000; Huang et al., 2007; Huang et al., 
2013; Kelloway et al., 2006; Zohar, 2002).  Therefore, evidence of criterion-related 
validity would be demonstrated if there is a positive relationship between the safety 
climate scales and safety behaviors, and an inverse relationship between the safety 
climate scales and the frequency of injuries. 
 Discriminant validity, the extent to which a measure does not correlate with an 
unrelated measure, was investigated by performing the Fornell and Larcker (1981) test.  
Discriminant validity is supported if the square root of a constructs average variance 
extracted (AVE) is greater than the correlations between that construct and other 
constructs under investigation. 
The individual safety behaviors construct was used in this study because it 
provides a measurable criterion for researchers, and it is more closely related to 
psychological factors than actual accidents or injuries (Christian et al., 2009).  Safety 
behavior was measured using a five-item scale intended to assess behavioral patterns that 
involve breaking rules and taking chances in core activities (Mearns et al., 2010).  This 
scale has been found to be reliable across different industries with a Cronbach’s α 
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ranging from .74 - .86 (Mearns et al., 2003; Mearns et al., 2010; Rundmo, 1996; 
Rundmo, 2000).  This scale includes questions such as “I ignore safety regulations to get 
the job done” and “I take shortcuts which involve little or no risk.”  Frequency of injuries 
was assessed by asking respondents how many times they have experienced an injury 
over the past year.  Since these outcomes reflect counts that are trichotomized into 
groups, calculating Cronbach’s α is not appropriate (Goldenhar et al., 2003).   
 Means, standard deviations, Cronbach’s α’s, and Pearson correlation coefficients 
were calculated using SPSS and individual-level data.  As shown in Table 6, all 
constructs display sufficient internal reliability with Cronbach’s α’s above .70 (Nunnally 
& Bernstein, 1994).  Furthermore, results of correlating the safety climate scales with 
self-reported safety behavior and frequency of injuries confirm the expected relationships 
because all dimensions of the organization and group-level safety climate scales were 
positively correlated to safety behaviors and negatively correlated to frequency of 
injuries.  These strong relationships provide evidence of criterion-related validity.  
Results of the Fornell and Larcker (1981) test show that the square root of all constructs’ 
AVEs were greater than any correlation between constructs.  This result provides 
evidence of discriminant validity of the scales. 
 The results from the reliability estimates, pilot study EFAs, CFA comparisons, 
and correlations with related and unrelated constructs suggest that the air transportation 
operations safety climate scales are internally consistent and valid. 
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Table 6: Means, Standard Deviations, Cronbach’s α’s, and Correlations 
Construct M SD α AVE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Mgmt commitment  5.77 1.13 .80 .58 .76         
2. Safety policies & procedures 5.57 1.20 .78 .57 .52 .75        
3. Safety training 5.26 1.25 .91 .63 .45 .62 .79       
4. Vehicles & equipment 4.99 1.47 .83 .62 .47 .49 .61 .79      
5. Commitment & support 6.01 0.90 .89 .61 .40 .47 .58 .47 .78     
6. Work pressure 4.78 1.45 .79 .58 .52 .35 .40 .36 .44 .76    
7. Safety briefings 5.58 1.07 .72 .50 .40 .44 .58 .40 .62 .31 .71   
8. Safety Behaviors 5.49 1.26 .91 .67 .39 .53 .40 .35 .48 .44 .38 .82  
9. Injuries .30 .62 n/a n/a -.17** -.14* -.25 -.28 -.18** -.17** 
-
.18** -.14* n/a 
Notes. Org-level safety climate consists of mgmt commitment, safety policies & procedures, safety training, and vehicles & equipment.   
Grp-level safety climate consists of commitment & support, work pressure, and safety briefings. 
Square root of AVE shown on diagonal. 
p < .001 unless otherwise noted; * p < .05.    ** p < .01. 
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2.5 Discussion 
 The purpose of this study was to develop a valid and reliable air transportation 
operations-specific safety climate scale using the USAF air transportation specialist as a 
proxy.  The newly developed scale uses a multi-level framework by separating the safety 
climate scale into perceptions of organization and group-level constructs, as 
recommended by Zohar (2010).  Results provide initial evidence of the reliability and 
validity of the newly developed safety climate measure.  A series of EFAs and CFAs 
confirmed the construct validity of the 15-item, four-factor solution for organization-level 
safety climate and the 10-item, three-factor solution for group-level safety climate.  
Organization-level safety climate was encompassed by the sub-dimensions of 
management commitment to safety, safety policies and procedures, safety training, and 
vehicles and equipment.  Group-level safety climate was comprised by the sub-
dimensions of commitment and support, work pressure, and safety briefings.  Evidence of 
criterion-related validity was supported due to the strong relationship between the 
organization and group-level safety climate scales and the theoretically related measures 
of self-reported safety behaviors and frequency of injuries.  These findings were 
consistent with many previous studies including Barling et al. (2002), Fogarty and Shaw, 
(2010), Huang et al. (2013), and Zohar (2002).  Finally, discriminant validity was 
demonstrated by performing the Fornell and Larcker (1981) test. 
2.5.1 Value of the Air Transportation Operations Safety Climate Construct 
 The value of an air transportation operations safety climate construct cannot be 
understated.  First and foremost, it can serve as a leading indicator for safety mishaps in 
48 
the air transportation operations industry.  And as previously mentioned, the 
consequences of these safety mishaps may reach far beyond the air transportation 
specialists themselves.  As such, being able to identify which organization may be at risk 
for a mishap can help leaders institute proactive mechanisms to mitigate such mishaps.  
Next, the new safety climate construct may be able to help differentiate between low and 
high-performing organizations when it comes to creating a climate of safety.  Leaders can 
look to the high-performing organizations to discover potential best practices that can be 
instituted throughout the industry.  Also, the safety climate scale can help diagnose 
organizations with low perceived safety climate and identify ways to help improve this 
climate.  For instance, one can look to see which dimension of organization or group-
level safety climate needs improvement, and a plan can be tailored specifically for that 
organization to address its issue(s).  Finally, the air transportation operations safety 
climate scale can be used to identify disconnects between the organization-level safety 
climate and group-level safety climate.  Since supervisors may have discretion in how 
they implement top management’s safety policies, and because individual differences 
between group-level supervisors exist, organization’s safety policies may be executed 
differently by each workgroup (Zohar, 2008).  So if the organization-level safety climate 
is found to be much higher than the group-level safety climate in an organization, it could 
be indicative of the group-level managers not fostering the same level of commitment to 
safety as the organization’s leaders.  It could also signify that safety policies and 
procedures have been misunderstood by group-level supervisors.  This scenario could 
signal the need for leadership at all levels to come together and ensure unity of effort 
throughout the organization. 
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2.5.2 Theoretical Implications  
 This research makes several important contributions to safety climate theory.  
First, although current safety climate theory and research is robust, it is not adequate to 
explain safety climate in the context of the air transportation operations industry.  This 
industry is characterized by dangerous work where accidents can have far-reaching 
implications, and safety issues in this arena need to be addressed.  This paper addresses 
Zohar’s (2010) call for industry-specific safety climate scales and serves as the initial 
study on the predictors of safety performance in air transportation operations industry.  
Several safety climate dimensions (i.e., management commitment to safety, safety 
policies and procedures, training) that were found to be important in this industry are also 
routinely found across most industries (Flin et al., 2000).  However, the safety briefings 
dimension, a dimension primarily found in the healthcare industry), was found to be 
instrumental in measuring group safety climate for air transportation operations 
personnel.  It was discovered during the interview portion of this research that safety 
briefings are given frequently throughout the day in the air transportation industry.  
Safety briefings are given at the beginning of each shift and prior to loading cargo on an 
aircraft, at a minimum.  In industries where safety briefings are mandated prior to 
performing work, the safety briefing dimension may be of upmost importance.  Although 
no unique safety climate dimension was found, it may be possible to identify safety 
climate dimensions that are important to industries with similar characteristics.  
Furthermore, even though no unique safety climate dimensions were discovered in this 
research effort, 16 out of the 25 scale items used in this study included context-specific 
language for the air transportation operations industry. 
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  Next, this research provides strong statistical and theoretical support for level-
adjusted safety climate scales in the air transportation operations industry.  Policies and 
procedures are instituted at the organization-level; however, group-level managers may 
have the authority to use discretion in implementing these policies and procedures.  
Individual employees are able to discriminate between these and they form their different 
perceptions between organization and group-level safety climate (Zohar, 2008).  The 
safety climate scales developed in this research are able to capture these perceptions. 
2.5.3 Managerial Implications 
 In addition to the theoretical contributions mentioned above, this research also has 
important managerial implications.  From the beginning, it has been shown that 
improvement in management attitudes and commitment towards safety are mandatory 
prerequisites for improving safety in an organization (Zohar, 1980).  By including the 
management commitment to safety sub-dimension for organization-level safety climate 
and the commitment and support sub-dimension for group-level safety climate, leaders 
can assess employee perceptions of leadership commitment to safety at the current time 
and in the future.  Safety climate scores can be compared over time to determine if actual 
improvement or deterioration is occurring and adjust accordingly.  The safety climate 
scores can serve as a gauge to see if safety climate improvement initiatives are being 
successful or not.   
Also, the air transportation operations safety climate scale can help managers gain 
an in depth understanding of the impact an individual’s safety climate perceptions may 
have on his or her safety decision-making process.  Results of this study can be used to 
see which safety climate sub-dimension plays the largest role in influencing employee 
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safety behaviors.  This could allow managers to target specific areas of improvement in 
safety climate to have the biggest impact on safety behaviors.  
Finally, it was found that organization and group-level safety climate perceptions 
exist for air transportations operations personnel, and that these different levels were both 
related to safety behaviors and frequency of injury.  This signals that it is not only 
important for supervisors to be better leaders that display a sincere commitment to safety 
and provide necessary safety equipment and training, but that organizations themselves 
may have to examine formal policies to ensure they are straight-forward, non-
contradictory, and help establish an environment that does not subjugate safety for 
performance. 
2.5.4 Limitations and Future Research 
 Although this research provides numerous contributions to theory and practice, it 
is not without key limitations that must be acknowledged.  First, USAF air transportation 
specialists were used as a proxy for this study, and this may hurt the generalizability of 
the findings.  It was discovered that there was a statistically significant difference 
between sample and population respondent rank in the validation study, and caution was 
recommended when generalizing findings of this study beyond the current sample.  
However, the CFAs between the pilot and validation studies garnered nearly identical 
results.  This provides evidence that the newly developed safety climate scales are robust 
for studying the safety climate of USAF air transportation specialists.  However, the 
intent of this research was to create an air transportation operations industry-specific 
safety climate scale, and this must be addressed.  The tasks required of USAF air 
transportation specialists were identified and compared to the same occupation within the 
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Air Reserve Component (e.g. Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve) and civilian air 
transportation operation companies, and these duties were found to be similar.  
Additionally, many organizational features in our sample are not exclusive to the 
military.  Many organizations share a similar hierarchical structure, have employees that 
must engage in high-risk and stressful activities, and have employees that must work 
directly with others in a team setting (Dvir et al., 2002).  Furthermore, safety is of vital 
importance to both military and civilian organizations, and previous safety and leadership 
research in both military and civilian contexts suggests no threat to external validity 
exists (Zohar & Luria, 2004; Zohar & Tenne-Gazit, 2008).  Even so, a follow-up study 
including civilian air transportation operations personnel should be conducted. 
 A second limitation of this study arises due to using self-reported measurement 
scales in the survey.  By using self-reported measurement scales, common method bias 
may be a concern, and some have noted that it may be a major threat to reliability and 
validity (Roxas & Lindsay, 2012).  To address this potential limitation, this study used 
several common method and social desirability bias minimization and detection 
techniques.  First, an anonymous, web-based survey was chosen for this research because 
research shows they may result in lower social desirability (Joinson, 1999).  A non-
response bias test was also performed.  Finally, Harmon’s one factor test was performed 
to determine if common method variance was an issue in the study (Podsakoff & Organ, 
1986).  If common method variance were a serious issue, one would expect a single 
factor to emerge from a factor analysis.  The test led to six factors with eigenvalues 
greater than one being extracted with factor 1 accounting for 38% of the variance.  
Although results of these analyses suggest that common method bias was not a concern in 
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this study, future studies should incorporate operational safety metrics and observed 
safety practices as outcomes. 
 The creation of the air transportation operations safety climate scale also has 
important implications for future research.  First, using the newly created scale, studies 
can be undertaken to determine how safety climate is created within the air transportation 
operations environment.  In addition to how safety climate is created in this industry, 
boundary conditions can be examined to discover what variables play a role in translating 
safety climate to safety behaviors.  Furthermore, Brown (1996) called for researchers to 
include safety as a central theme in future operations management research.  It is now 
twenty years later; however, safety and operational outcomes have still been largely 
examined in isolation of each other (Das et al., 2008, Pagell et al., 2014, Pagell et al, 
2015).  It is evident that safety and operations are often studied in a vacuum, and this 
research sets the stage for incorporating both in future air transportation operations 
research. 
 In conclusion, the air transportation operations industry is a high-risk environment 
with unique safety challenges.  As researchers and practitioners, it is our duty to develop 
better methods to help reduce the chances of safety incidents throughout the industry.  It 
has been shown that relying on safety recommendations is not enough to prevent future 
accidents (NTSB, 2015), and that a climate of safety can help reduce accidents and 
injuries (Zohar, 2010).  The goal of this research was to develop and validate an air 
transportation operations-specific safety climate scale that encompasses both the 
organization and group level in order to better understand how safety climate is created in 
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this environment.  Although more research is required, this study provides a solid 
foundation for future safety research in the air transportation operations industry. 
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III. The Effects of Safety Climate and OCBs on Operational Performance 
3.1 Introduction 
 Safety climate has been studied extensively across many different industries to 
better understand safety performance of employees and to help develop methods to 
reduce workplace accidents.  However, the relationship between safety and operational 
performance is still not fully understood.  Researchers believe that safety climate, the 
perceptions employees have of the importance their organization places on safety, often 
competes with rules and procedures of other domains such as productivity and efficiency 
(Neal & Griffin, 2006; Zohar, 2010; Zohar & Luria, 2005); however, this idea has rarely 
been investigated.  The lack of integrated safety and operational performance research 
was first highlighted by Brown (1996) when she mentioned that despite workplace safety 
being a growing concern for operations managers, safety was practically non-existent in 
the operations literature.  Brown (1996) called for researchers to include safety as a 
central theme in future operations management research.  It is now twenty one years 
later; however, safety and operational outcomes have still been largely examined in 
isolation of each other (Das et al., 2008; Pagell et al., 2014; Pagell et al., 2015).  The 
purpose of this research is to investigate the effects of safety climate on organizational 
citizenship behaviors (OCBs) and operational performance of air transportation 
operations personnel.   
Although the literature investigating the links between safety and productivity are 
minimal, theoretical and empirical evidence does exist that shows a positive relationship 
may in fact exist.  For instance, Michael et al. (2005) invoke social exchange theory and 
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organizational support theory to link perceptions of management commitment to safety to 
individual employee performance in the wood manufacturing industry.  The authors 
concluded that a strong commitment to safety by management may result in better 
operational performance by individual employees.  Das et al. (2008) use cognitive 
dissonance theory and found that safety disconnects, defined as the difference in manager 
and worker perceptions regarding safety, may result in lower worker effectiveness and 
quality of work.  Additionally, Pagell et al. (2014) conducted a series of 10 case studies 
on production and distribution facilities in Ontario, Canada to determine if it is possible 
to concurrently create a safe and productive workplace.  The authors found that 
productivity and safety were in conflict in organizations that displayed a day-to-day 
output-oriented culture.  However, the authors also found that when a supportive culture 
and joint management systems were employed, organizations were able to be safe and 
productive.  Finally, Pagell et al. (2015) surveyed 198 manufacturing facilities throughout 
Ontario, Canada in order to assess whether or not safety and operational effectiveness 
were contradictory or complementary to one another.  The authors found that when an 
organization chooses to implement a joint management system, managing safety and 
operations in a coordinated fashion, safety and operations were complementary.  Results 
of the previous two studies suggest that the long-held belief of safety and productivity 
being incongruent may be inaccurate.  Rather, safety and productivity may in fact be 
complementary and dependent upon an organizational culture that is simultaneously 
supportive of safety and operations.   
Organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs) may play a key role in the 
relationship between safety climate and operational performance.  OCBs have been 
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shown to contribute to organizational success by enhancing coworker and managerial 
productivity, freeing up resources, and by helping coordinate activities within and across 
work groups (Organ, 1988).  OCBs are discretionary, extra-role behaviors that promote 
the effective functioning of the organization (Organ, 1988).  Furthermore, OCBs have 
been shown to be influenced by work environmental factors such as safety (Somech & 
Drach-Zahavy, 2004).  Lee et al. (2007), through the lens of organizational support 
theory, linked safety climate to work attitudes whereas Michael et al. (2005) and 
Podsakoff et al. (2000) used organizational support theory to link OCBs to performance 
outcomes.  While the aforementioned studies link safety climate to OCBs and OCBs to 
operational performance, no such studies exist that tie these three concepts together in 
one consolidated effort.  The current research proposes that higher levels of safety 
climate will be associated with higher levels of OCBs, and in turn, higher levels of 
operational performance.  In the following section, theoretical support is provided for the 
hypotheses. 
3.2 Conceptual Background 
3.2.1 Safety Climate and Organizational Citizenship Behaviors 
 Safety climate, the measurable aspect of safety culture, has been shown to be 
shaped by the safety policies, practices, and supported behaviors of the organization 
(Huang et al., 2013; Zohar, 2010).  For instance, if productivity is perceived to be favored 
over safety, and safety policies, procedures, and practices are routinely subjugated, the 
perceived safety climate of the organization will be lower than that of an organization 
that does not favor productivity to the detriment of safety.  Safety climate exists at both 
58 
the organization and group level, with organization-level safety climate being shaped by 
perceptions of enforced company policies and procedures, while group-level safety 
climate is shaped by perceptions of supervisory safety practices (Zohar, 2000; Zohar, 
2003).  Because of the multi-level safety climate framework, separate constructs should 
be used for each level when examining safety climate.  Furthermore, safety climate has 
been found to be a robust predictor of safety performance with lower safety climate 
leading to higher accident rates, and vice versa (Barling et al., 2002; Fogarty & Shaw, 
2010; Griffin & Neal, 2000; Huang et al., 2007; Kelloway et al., 2006; Zohar, 2002).  It is 
believed this occurs due to employees using their perceptions of safety climate to drive 
their own safety behaviors (Zohar, 1980).  Interestingly, there is increasing evidence that 
safety climate may influence non-safety related behaviors as well.  Recently safety 
climate has been found to be positively related to job satisfaction, organizational 
commitment, and intent to stay (Clarke, 2010; Huang et al., 2015; Kath et al., 2010; 
Mearns et al., 2010; Michael et al., 2005; Nahrgang et al., 2011; Swartz et al., 2017). 
Yet another type of behavior that safety climate may influence is called OCB.  
OCBs are discretionary, extra-role behaviors that promote the effective functioning of the 
organization (Organ, 1988).  These behaviors have been shown to be influenced by work 
environmental factors such as safety (Somech & Drach-Zahavy, 2004).  OCBs have been 
found to be multi-dimensional in nature, and include sub-dimensions such as helping 
behavior, sportsmanship, and civic virtue (Podsakoff, 2000).  Helping behavior is 
characterized by an individual voluntarily helping others with work related issues.  
Sportsmanship is described as being willing to sacrifice one’s own personal interests for 
the good of the work group and as not complaining when work circumstances are less 
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than ideal (Podsakoff, 2000).  Finally, Podsakoff (2000) defines civic virtue as an 
employee participating in and being concerned about the life of the company.  OCBs 
have been shown to contribute to organizational success by enhancing coworker and 
managerial productivity, freeing up resources, and by helping coordinate activities within 
and across work groups (Organ, 1988).     
Organizational support theory offers insight into how safety climate may 
influence OCBs.  Organizational support theory is an extension of social exchange 
theory, and both include the idea of reciprocity as a central theme.  Social exchange 
theory describes these exchanges as interactions in which employees trade effort and 
loyalty for benefits such as a safe work environment (Williams et al., 2011).  
Organizational support theory extends this relationship to say that employees use these 
social exchanges to form opinions on how much the employer values their contributions 
and well-being (Michael et al., 2005).  Michael et al. (2005) further state that these 
opinions are used to form an employee attitude called perceived organizational support 
(POS), which corresponds to how employees feel about their employer fairly 
compensating them, whether their employer helps them when in need, and whether or not 
they are provided good working conditions (Eisenberger et al., 1986).  When an 
employee works in a high-risk environment where safety mishaps can have catastrophic 
effects on themselves or others, providing safe working conditions may take on even 
more importance when it comes to increasing POS.  Thus, increases in perceived safety 
climate in high-risk industries may increase an employee’s POS.   
It has been discovered that increases in POS motivate employees to work harder 
for three reasons: 1) POS produces an obligation to care about the organization and help 
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it reach its objectives, 2) the approval and respect conveyed by POS fills an employee’s 
socioemotional need and leads to the employee incorporating the organization into part of 
their social identity, and 3) POS strengthens the employee’s belief that the organization 
rewards increased performance (Rhoades & Eisenberger, 2002).  Therefore, when the 
organization values the safety of an employee and provides a safe working environment, 
the employee feels more of a sense of belonging to the organization and may engage in 
extra-role commitments such as OCBs that will mutually benefit the employee and the 
organization.  This phenomenon may be particularly salient in high risk environments 
whereby employees must protect themselves and external stakeholders from harm.  
Hence, the following relationship is hypothesized between organization-level safety 
climate and OCBs: 
 
H1a. Organization-level safety climate is positively related to organizational citizenship 
behaviors. 
 
 In addition to employees forming opinions on how much the organization values 
their contributions, they also form opinions on how much their supervisors value their 
contributions and well-being (Rhoades & Eisenberger, 2002).  Rhoades and Eisenberger 
(2002) go on to state that supervisors act as agents of the organization, and therefore 
employees use the actions of supervisors as indicators of organizational support.  When 
supervisors in high-risk environments value the safety of the employee, the employee 
may have a higher sense of POS and thus engage in OCBs as a result.  Therefore, the 
following relationship is hypothesized between group-level safety climate and OCBs: 
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H1b. Group-level safety climate is positively related to organizational citizenship 
behaviors. 
 
 Furthermore, safety policies and procedures are created by organizational 
leadership to help achieve strategic objectives.  First line supervisors must interpret, 
implement, and execute these safety policies and procedures.  Since these group-level 
supervisors are bounded by the organization-level safety policies and procedures, it is 
expected that organization-level safety climate will be positively related to group-level 
safety climate (Zohar & Luria, 2005), and that group-level safety climate will mediate the 
relationship between organization-level safety climate and organizational citizenship 
behaviors.  
 
H1c. Organization-level safety is positively related to group-level safety climate. 
  
H1d. Group-level safety climate mediates the positive relationship between organization-
level safety climate and organizational citizenship behaviors. 
 
3.2.2 Organizational Citizenship Behaviors and Operational Performance 
 Organizational support theory offers a valuable lens when understanding how 
OCBs and its dimensions of helping behavior, sportsmanship, and civic virtue may 
impact operational performance.  Rhoades and Eisenberger (2002) explain that perceived 
organizational support should increase an employee’s job performance and lead to extra-
role activities such as helping other employees and offering suggestions for the 
organization to be more effective.  These benefits coincide with Organ’s (1988) 
explanation of OCBs contributing to organizational success by enhancing coworker and 
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managerial productivity, freeing up resources, and helping coordinate activities within 
and across work groups.   
The helping behavior dimension is characterized by experienced employees 
helping newer or less experienced employees solve work-related problems and perform 
their jobs more efficiently (Podsakoff et al., 1997).  This can contribute to organizational 
performance by improving overall employee performance and by freeing up managerial 
resources.  Instead of a manager having to spend more time with the new employee, he or 
she can focus on other important tasks since established employees have gone out of their 
way to help the newer employee.   
A similar result may also be seen with sportsmanship.  When high levels of 
sportsmanship are present, employees keep good attitudes and remain in high spirits even 
when conditions at work are less than ideal.  Furthermore, employees put the 
organization’s interests above their own.  This may lead to a positive work environment 
and gain more cooperation from other employees (Podsakoff et al., 1997).  This would 
free up managers from having to spend time calming down frustrated employees, 
allowing the managers to focus on other tasks.   
Civic virtue may have a positive effect on operational performance.  When 
employees display civic virtue, they are more active in work meetings and offer 
suggestions on how the organization can improve overall (Podsakoff et al., 1997).  These 
meetings often include people from multiple work groups; therefore, the information 
shared during these meetings can benefit multiple departments throughout an 
organization.  Updates to policies, suggested improvements to policies and procedures, 
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and best practices are among some of the topics that could be discussed during these 
meetings that could help an organization be more productive.   
 There are multiple studies that empirically link OCBs to operational performance.  
Podsakoff et al. (1997) studied the effects of OCBs on the quantity and quality of the 
performance of 218 people in 40 work groups in the paper mill industry.  They found that 
helping behavior and sportsmanship had significant effects on performance quantity and 
that helping behavior had a significant impact on performance quality.  Wang et al. 
(2005) surveyed supervisors and subordinates from multiple organizations in China to 
analyze the effects of transformational leadership, leader-member exchange, OCBs and 
task performance.  They found that employee OCBs were positively related to 
supervisory ratings of employee task performance.  Finally, Walz and Niehoff (2000) 
researched the link between OCBs and organizational effectiveness in limited-menu 
restaurants.  They found that OCBs were associated with lower costs, increased revenues, 
increased perceived company quality, increased operating efficiency, increased customer 
satisfaction, and fewer customer complaints.  Walz and Niehoff (2000) concluded that 
developing an environment that promotes OCBs may enhance management’s 
productivity and organizational effectiveness.  Based on the above, the following 
hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H2. Organizational citizenship behaviors are positively related to perceptions of 
individual operational performance. 
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3.3.3 Indirect Effects of Safety Climate on Operational Performance 
 In the previous sections, it was explained why organization and group-level safety 
climate would be related to OCBs, and why OCBs would be related to operational 
performance.  Therefore, it is also expected that organization and group-level safety 
climate would be related to operational performance through the mediating effect of 
OCBs.  However, OCBs may not be able to fully explain safety climate’s relationship 
with operational performance.  There may be other factors to consider when explaining 
the expected relationship between safety climate and operational performance such as 
safety disconnects, perceptions of management commitment to safety, and the presence 
of a joint management system for safety and production (Das et al., 2008; Michael et al., 
2005; Pagell et al., 2014; Pagell et al., 2015).  Therefore, the following hypotheses are 
proposed for the relationship between safety climate and perceptions of individual 
operational performance.   
 
H3a. Organizational citizenship behaviors will partially mediate the relationship 
between organization-level safety climate and perceptions of individual operational 
performance.  
 
H3b. Organizational citizenship behaviors will partially mediate the relationship 
between group-level safety climate and perceptions of individual operational 
performance. 
 
The conceptual model and hypotheses are depicted in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Proposed Structural Equation Model 
3.4 Methodology 
3.4.1 Data Collection 
The study was conducted using survey data collected from air transportation 
specialists assigned to 22 United States Air Force (USAF) organizations.  These 
organizations consisted of eight continental and six overseas USAF aerial port squadrons 
(APS) as well as eight continental USAF logistics readiness squadrons (LRS) in which 
air transportation specialists are assigned.  A list of current USAF APS’s were provided 
by the sponsor of the research, the USAF Air Mobility Command Director of Logistics 
(AMC/A4).  A total of 16 USAF APS’s were identified and invited to participate in the 
research.  Each USAF APS commander was contacted via telephone and email in order 
to communicate the nature of the research and gain approval, and approval was obtained 
from 14 commanders.  The commanders of the remaining two organizations did not 
respond to the request; therefore, those organizations were not included in the research.  
To obtain a list of USAF LRS’s to include in the research, the logistics support branch of 
the USAF Installation and Mission Support Center (IMSC) was contacted.  The USAF 
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IMSC provided a list of eight USAF LRS’s to include in the research.  These 
organizations were selected due to them having at least five air transportation specialists 
assigned.  Each of the organization’s commanders was contacted via telephone and email 
to gain approval for their personnel to participate in the research, and all commanders 
agreed to let their personnel participate.   
All 2,456 air transportation specialists assigned to the 22 USAF organizations 
previously mentioned were invited to participate in this survey on a voluntary and 
confidential basis.  Each individual was sent an introductory email explaining the 
research followed up with an official survey invitation email that included a web link to 
the online survey.  A reminder email was sent out one week after the official survey 
invitation, and a final reminder email was sent one week later in accordance with 
accepted survey protocol with accepted survey protocol (Fink, 2012; Neuman, 2011; 
Salant & Dillman, 1994).  No individual identifiers were collected for this study.  The 
average time of completion of the survey was approximately 21 minutes.  Furthermore, 
each respondent had the opportunity to be entered into a drawing for a $50 gift card upon 
completion of the survey.   
 Completed surveys were received from 340 air transportation specialists for a 
response rate of 13.8%; however, 22 responses were deleted due to unengaged 
respondents.  The unengaged respondents were identified due to answering all Likert 
questions as a “7”, including the items that had to be reverse coded.  No issues were 
found with missing responses in this study.  This resulted in a final sample of 318 
responses (13% response rate).  A comparison was made with regard to rank and age 
distribution to assess the characteristics of the sample relative to the population (see 
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Table 7).  The sample was overrepresented by air transportation specialists in the non-
commissioned officer (NCO) ranks of E-5 though E-6, and underrepresented in the 
Airman (Amn) ranks of E-1 through E-4.  One reason for these results may be due to the 
fact that the air transportation specialist technical school was not included in the survey 
sample.  All new air transportation specialist Amn attend this technical school, and it 
consists primarily of personnel in the Amn ranks.  The technical school was not included 
because it is not an operational organization.  Because of this, and because there was no 
difference in age between the sample and population, it was concluded that the research 
sample was representative of the air transportation specialist population.     
Table 7: USAF air transportation specialist sample and population comparison 
 Population Sample 
# 4530  318 
Age 27.6  29.0 
SD 6.4 6.2 
  Population Sample 
E-1 0.6% 0.8% 
E-2 3.1% 1.7% 
E-3 24.7% 14.7% 
E-4 22.9% 20.1% 
E-5 25.6% 30.5% 
E-6 13.8% 22.2% 
E-7 7.4% 9.2% 
E-8 1.3% 0.8% 
E-9 0.7% 0.0% 
 
3.4.2 Variables 
The key constructs included in this research are organization-level safety climate 
(OSC), group-level safety climate (GSC), OCB, and self-reported operational 
performance.  The OSC and GSC measurement scales were recently developed by the 
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researcher and are specific to the air transportation operations industry.  These 
measurement scales were developed using an exploratory sequential mixed methods 
research design.  A qualitative inquiry was performed first, and Creswell’s (2014) six-
step process for qualitative data analysis was used to guide this inquiry.  This consisted of 
a review of the relevant literature, semi-structured interviews, and site visits in order to 
gather raw data.  Once completed, interviews were transcribed and coded in order to 
uncover relevant safety climate themes (Saldaña, 2012).  These themes were interpreted 
and used to develop a series of survey instruments.  Air transportation specialists residing 
in USAF organizations were the target participants for this research effort.  This research 
and research procedures were reviewed and approved by an Institutional Review Board 
and the Air Force Survey Control Office.  In the first study, 4 site visits and 23 semi-
structured interviews were conducted and analyzed in order to develop an initial set of 62 
items for organization safety climate and 76 items for group safety climate.  In the second 
study, the safety climate scales were further reduced to 14 items for organizational safety 
climate and 10 items for group safety climate by analyzing the inter-item correlations and 
performing an exploratory factor analysis.  Finally, a third study was conducted using 
confirmatory factor analysis and inter-item correlations to validate the proposed air 
transportation operations safety climate scales (Campbell & Fiske, 1959; Hinkin, 1998; 
Schwab, 1980).  The OSC and GSC measurement scales were found to be valid and 
reliable in the previous studies.   
OSC was measured by a second-order, four-factor, 15-item scale asking 
respondents to assess the extent to which they agree or disagree with statements 
concerning the OSC dimensions of management commitment to safety, safety policies 
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and procedures, safety training, and vehicles and equipment.  The OSC items were 
intended to capture perceptions of safety related to organizational leadership.  GSC was 
measured by a second-order, three-factor, 10-item scale asking respondents to assess the 
extent to which they agree or disagree with statements concerning the GSC dimensions of 
commitment and support, work pressure, and safety briefings.  The GSC items were 
intended to capture perceptions of safety related to one’s immediate work group.  OCB 
was measured using a three-factor, 13-item scale developed by Podsakoff et al. (1997).  
This scale has been found reliable across a variety of industries with Cronbach α’s 
ranging from .67 to .96 (Deckop et al., 2003; Podsakoff et al., 1997; Robinson & 
Morrison, 1995).  The OCB scale asked respondents to assess the extent to which they 
agree or disagree with statements concerning whether or not they engage in the OCB 
dimensions of helping behavior, civic virtue, and sportsmanship.  Finally, self-reported 
operational performance was measured with a 7-item in-role performance scale 
developed by Williams and Anderson (1991) that has been found reliable across a variety 
of industries with Cronbach α’s ranging from .72 to .93 (Deckop et al., 2003; Hui & Law, 
1999; Meyerson & Kline, 2008; Williams & Anderson, 1991).  The operational 
performance scale asked respondents to assess the extent to which they agree or disagree 
with statements concerning how well they perform their assigned duties.  All items were 
measured on a 7-point scale and can be found in Appendix B.1. 
The Cronbach α’s for the included constructs ranged from .73 to .92, which was 
beyond the recommended level of .70 for general research (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994).  
To investigate the presence of common method bias, Harmon’s one-factor test was used 
(Podsakoff & Organ, 1986).  This test resulted in ten factors accounting for 68% of the 
70 
variance, with the first factor accounting for 29.7%.  No single factor emerged, and no 
factor accounted for most of the variance, which leads to the conclusion that common 
method bias was not a concern with this data (Podsakoff et al., 2003).  Finally, a non-
response bias test was conducted to compare the responses of early and late respondents 
and to compare the results of APS versus LRS respondents.  For the early versus late 
respondents, groups were separated into those that responded to the first email versus 
those that responded to follow-up emails.  A t-test analysis was used to determine if there 
were statistically significant differences between responses of the two groups.  Results 
showed that there was a significant difference in responses to only three variables when 
comparing APS versus LRS responses (see Table 8).  No statistically significant 
difference was found for any variable when comparing early versus late respondents.  It 
was concluded that non-response bias was not a major concern in this study.   
Table 8: Differences between APS versus LRS responses 
Variable Group n Mean SD p-value 
OVE1 APS 241 4.27 1.64 0.001 
LRS 77 5.00 1.73 
 
    
 
OVE2 APS 241 4.84 1.80 0.001 
LRS 77 5.56 1.52 
 
    
 
GSB1 APS 241 6.10 0.99 0.015 
LRS 77 5.75 1.37 
 
3.5 Analysis and Results 
 A combination of SPSS and AMOS 18.0, using the maximum likelihood 
estimation method, was used for the analysis.  A two-step procedure was used to test the 
proposed model, as recommended by Anderson and Gerbing (1988).  First, a 
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confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was conducted using the measurement model to 
assess construct and discriminant validity.  Next, the structural model was used to test the 
proposed hypotheses  
3.5.1 Measurement Model Results 
 To assess construct and discriminant validity, a CFA was performed using AMOS 
18.0.  The constructs representing OSC, GSC, OCBHB, OCBCV, OCBS, and OP were 
included in the CFA.  The measurement model resulted in the following fit indices:  χ2 
(1001.57, df = 642, p-value < .001); comparative fit index (CFI) (.95); incremental fit 
index (IFI) (.95); standardized root mean residual (SRMR) (.048); and root mean square 
error of approximation (RMSEA) (.042, 90% CI (.037, .047)).  The fit indices indicate an 
adequate model fit with the exception of the χ2 statistic (Hu & Bentler, 1999).  Although 
a significant χ2 statistic was obtained, the normed χ2 statistic was 1.56 which fell well 
below the recommended maximum of 3.0 (Kline, 2011).   
 To test for convergent validity, factor loadings were assessed along with the 
average variance extracted (AVE) for each construct.  Standardized factor loadings and 
AVEs are shown in Table 9.  All items loaded onto their corresponding constructs with p 
< .001, and all but five variables had factor loadings exceeding the recommended 0.6 
threshold recommended by Hair et al. (2010).  The OCB sub-dimensions of helping 
behavior, civic virtue, and sportsmanship had two, one, and one item respectively that 
was below the threshold.  Individual operational performance had one item that was 
significantly lower than the 0.60 threshold.  The rule of thumb for using AVE to assess 
convergent validity is 0.5 which means that the variance explained by the construct is 
greater than what is due to measurement error (Hair et al., 2010).  All constructs with the 
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exception of helping behavior, civic virtue, and sportsmanship had AVEs above the 0.50 
threshold.  Coincidentally, these represent the dimensions of OCB in this study.  Helping 
behavior and sportsmanship fell just below the recommended level with AVEs of 0.48, 
and civic virtue had an AVE of 0.42.  Due to these constructs having low AVEs and 
variables with factor loadings below the recommended 0.6 threshold, remedial measures 
were taken.  Items HB1, HB3, CV3, and OCBS1 were subsequently removed from the 
analysis.  Adjustments to these scales have had to be made in previous research due to 
significant cross loadings and Cronbach’s α levels below the recommended threshold 
(Podsakoff et al., 1997).  Removal of these variables resulted in AVEs above .5 for all 
constructs.  The updated factor loadings and AVEs are shown in Table 10.  These results 
provide evidence of convergent validity.   
 Discriminant validity was assessed by performing the Fornell and Larcker (1981) 
test.  According to this test, discriminant validity is supported if the square root of a 
construct’s AVE is greater than the correlations between that construct and other 
constructs used in the model.  As shown in Table 11, all constructs passed this test, which 
provides evidence of discriminant validity.  Internal consistency was examined using 
Cronbach’s α.  All constructs with the exception of civic virtue had alpha levels at or 
above the recommended minimum level of 0.70 (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994).  Civic 
virtue’s alpha was just under the recommended level at 0.65.  Results for the structural 
model follow. 
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Table 9: Results of CFA 
Constructs and scale items Factor loadings Constructs and scale items Factor loadings 
Management commitment to safety 
(AVE = 0.60)  
Safety briefings (AVE = 0.53) 
 
  OMC1 0.65   GSB1 0.64 
  OMC2 0.79   GSB2 0.79 
  OMC3 0.87   GSB3 0.75 
Safety policies and procedures  
(AVE = 0.57)  
Helping behavior (AVE = 0.48) 
 
  OSP1 0.81   HB1* 0.58 
  OSP2 0.76   HB2 0.72 
  OSP3 0.69   HB3* 0.57 
Safety training (AVE = 0.64)    HB4 0.63 
  OT1 0.82   HB5 0.82 
  OT2 0.79   HB6 0.74 
  OT3 0.85   HB7 0.76 
  OT4 0.78 Civic Virtue (AVE = 0.42)  
  OT5 0.83   CV1 0.79 
  OT6 0.73   CV2 0.60 
Vehicles and equipment (AVE = 0.60)    CV3* 0.53 
  OVE1 0.71 Sportsmanship (AVE = 0.49)  
  OVE2 0.58   OCBS1* 0.47 
  OVE3 0.98   OCBS2 0.71 
Management commitment and 
coworker support (AVE = 0.60)  
  OCBS3 0.84 
  GMCS1 0.80 
Individual operational performance 
(AVE = 0.54)  
  GMCS2 0.79   IP1 0.54 
  GMCS3 0.79   IP2 0.87 
  GMCS4 0.74   IP3 0.89 
Work pressure (AVE = 0.55)    IP4 0.88 
  GWP1 0.76   IP5 0.29 
  GWP2 0.75   
  GWP3 0.72   
Notes: All t-values were significant with p < .001. 
* indicates item was subsequently removed from the analysis 
The OSC construct consists of management commitment to safety, safety policies and procedures, safety training, 
and vehicles and equipment.  The GSC construct consists of management commitment and coworker support, work 
pressure, and safety briefings.  The OCB construct consists of helping behavior, civic virtue, and sportsmanship. 
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Table 10: Results of CFA after HB1, HB3, CV3, and OCBS1 were removed 
Constructs and scale items Factor loadings   Constructs and scale items Factor loadings 
Management commitment to safety 
(AVE = 0.60)  
Safety briefings (AVE = 0.53) 
 
  OMC1 0.65   GSB1 0.64 
  OMC2 0.79   GSB2 0.79 
  OMC3 0.87   GSB3 0.75 
Safety policies and procedures  
(AVE = 0.57)  
Helping behavior (AVE = 0.55) 
 
  OSP1 0.82   HB2 0.71 
  OSP2 0.76   HB4 0.63 
  OSP3 0.69   HB5 0.83 
Safety training (AVE = 0.64)    HB6 0.75 
  OT1 0.82   HB7 0.76 
  OT2 0.79 Civic Virtue (AVE = 0.54)  
  OT3 0.85   CV1 0.88 
  OT4 0.78   CV2 0.55 
  OT5 0.83 Sportsmanship (AVE = 0.61)  
  OT6 0.73   OCBS2 0.72 
Vehicles and equipment (AVE = 0.60)    OCBS3 0.84 
  OVE1 0.71 
Individual operational performance 
(AVE = 0.54)  
  OVE2 0.53   IP1 0.54 
  OVE3 0.98   IP2 0.87 
Management commitment and 
coworker support (AVE = 0.60)  
  IP3 0.89 
  GMCS1 0.79   IP4 0.88 
  GMCS2 0.78   IP5 0.29 
  GMCS3 0.79   
  GMCS4 0.74   
Work pressure (AVE = 0.56)  
  
  GWP1 0.77   
  GWP2 0.75   
  GWP3 0.72   
Notes: All t-values were significant with p < .001. 
The OSC construct consists of management commitment to safety, safety policies and procedures, safety training, 
and vehicles and equipment.  The GSC construct consists of management commitment and coworker support, work 
pressure, and safety briefings.  The OCB construct consists of helping behavior, civic virtue, and sportsmanship.. 
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Table 11: Means, standard deviations, reliability, AVE, and correlations 
Construct Mean SD CA AVE OMC OSP OT OVE GMCS GWP GSB OCBHB OCBCV OCBS OP 
OMC 5.77 1.14 0.81 0.60 0.77           
OSP 5.63 1.17 0.79 0.57 0.53† 0.75          
OT 5.29 1.28 0.92 0.64 0.48† 0.60† 0.80         
OVE 5.14 1.45 0.84 0.60 0.48† 0.48† 0.60† 0.77        
GMCS 6.04 0.90 0.88 0.60 0.40† 0.47† 0.59† 0.48† 0.77       
GWP 4.75 1.45 0.78 0.56 0.50† 0.31† 0.36† 0.30† 0.39† 0.75      
GSB 5.56 1.13 0.76 0.53 0.41† 0.44† 0.59† 0.39† 0.62† 0.29† 0.73     
OCBHB 6.20 0.64 0.85 0.55 0.34† 0.32† 0.39† 0.30† 0.44† 0.32† 0.41† 0.74    
OCBCV 5.87 0.91 0.65 0.54 0.27† 0.20† 0.30† 0.14* 0.26† 0.27† 0.35† 0.61† 0.73   
OCBS 4.89 1.20 0.76 0.61 0.20† 0.13* 0.24† 0.20† 0.21† 0.35† 0.10ns 0.25† 0.11* 0.78  
OP 6.25 0.62 0.73 0.54 0.25† 0.23† 0.25† 0.22† 0.19† 0.20† 0.15** 0.40† 0.36† 0.17** 0.73 
Notes: † p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05 
Square root of AVE shown on diagonal 
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3.5.2 Structural Model Results 
Next, all hypotheses were tested via structural equation modeling using the 
maximum likelihood method in Amos 18.  Mediation hypotheses were evaluated using 
the bootstrap test of indirect effects as suggested by Zhao et al. (2010).  This was 
accomplished using 5,000 re-samples with replacement using Shrout and Bolger’s (2002) 
bias-corrected bootstrap method to determine the product of the mediation pathway with 
a 95% confidence interval.  The structural model provided acceptable fit (χ2 = 1158.319; 
df = 682; normed χ2 = 1.70; p < .001; CFI = 0.93; IFI = 0.93; SRMR = .061; RMSEA = 
.047 with a 90% CI of (0.42, 0.52)) and was deemed acceptable for hypothesis testing.  
Both direct and mediated effects were predicted and tested between exogenous and 
endogenous variables.  Results are presented in Table 12 and Figure 4. 
H1a predicted a positive relationship between OSC and OCB.  However, results 
of the model suggest OSC is not significantly related to OCB (γ = -.35, z = .140, p = .77), 
which leads to H1a being rejected.  H1b predicted a positive relationship would exist 
between GSC and OCB, and this hypothesis was confirmed (β = .453, z = .140, p = .001).  
As expected, a statistically significant positive relationship was found between OSC and 
GSC (γ = .761, z = .080, p < .001), lending support to H1c.  Although H1a was rejected, a 
significant indirect effect was found between OSC and OCB through the mediated effect 
of GSC (γ = .345, 95%CI (.105, .779), p = .02).  According to Zhao et al. (2010), a 
significant indirect effect is all that is required to establish mediation.  Thus, the path 
between OSC and OCB was fully mediated by GSC, and H1d was supported. 
Hypotheses H2, H3a and H3b postulated that OCB would be positively related to 
OP and that OCB would partially mediate the relationships between the safety climate 
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constructs and OP.  Specifically, H2 predicted that OCB would be positively related to 
OP.  A significant positive effect was found between these two variables, lending support 
for the hypothesis (β = .386, z = .07, p < .001).  Furthermore, H3a proposed that OCB 
would partially mediate the positive relationship between OSC and OP.  However, Shrout 
and Bolger’s (2002) bias-corrected bootstrap method resulted in a non-significant 
mediation path, leading to a rejection of H3a (γ = -.019, 95% CI (-.268, .116), p =.859).  
Interestingly, a significant direct path was found between OSC and OP (γ = .171, z = 
.074, p = .02), and this may be an indication of missing variables in the model.  For H3b, 
which proposed that OCB would partially mediate the positive relationship between GSC 
and OP, a significant mediated path was found (β = .175, 95%CI (.052, .486, p = .017).  
However, the direct effect of GSC on OP was non-significant (β = -.182, z = .094, p = 
.053).  This resulted in a fully mediated relationship between GSC and OP through OCB, 
lending partial support for H3b.   
Table 12: Structural Equation Model Results 
Structural path Hypothesis Effect SE t-value p-value LCL UCL Supported 
OSC  OCB H1a -0.035 0.14 -0.3 0.77 --- --- No 
GSC  OCB H1b 0.453 0.14 3.18 0.001 --- --- Yes 
OSC  GSC H1c 0.761 0.08 9.48 0.001 --- --- Yes 
OSC  GSC  OCB H1d 0.345 0.241 --- 0.02 0.105 0.779 Yes 
OCB  OP H2 0.386 0.07 5.76 0.001 --- --- Yes 
OSC  OCB  OP H3a -0.019 0.186 --- 0.859 -0.268 0.116 No 
GSC  OCB  OP H3b 0.175 0.225 --- 0.017 0.052 0.486 Yes 
Note:  *Bootstrap upper and lower confidence intervals for the indirect effects   
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Figure 4. Final SEM model based on significant direct paths  
*** p < .001; p < .05; SMC = squared multiple correlation 
3.6 Discussion 
 Typically, safety climate is studied solely in the realm of safety and safety 
outcomes.  However, the purpose of this research was to expand the safety climate 
research horizons and investigate its effects on organizational citizenship behaviors and 
operational performance of air transportation operations personnel.  Although researchers 
believe safety climate may compete with productivity and efficiency (Neal & Griffin, 
2006; Zohar, 2010; Zohar & Luria, 2005), results of this study provide evidence that 
safety climate may be able to enhance operational performance of air transportation 
operations personnel.  Organization-level safety climate was found to positively influence 
group-level safety climate, which in turn, positively influenced organizational citizenship 
behaviors. As expected, organizational citizenship behaviors positively influenced self-
reported operational performance.  And although no direct link was found between 
group-level safety climate and operational performance, a significant and positive 
indirect link was found between group safety climate and operational performance, which 
was mediated by organizational citizenship behaviors.  Interestingly, organization-level 
safety climate was found to be positively related to operational performance.  This 
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warrants further investigation, as this relationship may be further explained by other 
constructs such as a joint management system.  Maybe just as important, no negative 
influence was found between safety climate and operational performance, which is 
contradictory to the widely-held belief that safety climate and operational performance 
may compete with each other (Neal & Griffin, 2006; Zohar, 2010; Zohar & Luria, 2005).     
 Although the results are promising, it was surprising that organization-level safety 
climate had no direct relationship with organizational citizenship behaviors.  This may be 
due to the hierarchical structure of the organizations involved in this study.  Group-level 
supervisors work alongside the employees on a daily basis, whereas organizational 
leaders have much less contact with the employees.  This separation between employees 
and organizational leadership was mentioned in survey comments.  Even so, 
organization-level safety climate explained 75% of the variance in group-level safety 
climate, which is evidence of its powerful overall effect.  This could be due to the high-
risk environment the participants of the study operate in.  When mishaps can result in 
millions of dollars in damages or loss of life, group-level supervisors may not have a lot 
of variance in the way they interpret, implement, and execute the organization’s safety 
policies and procedures.  It would be interesting to investigate whether this strong a 
relationship is present in other industries where there is much less risk of injury or death.  
Overall, these results help advance the understanding of the relationship between safety 
and operational performance 
3.6.1 Theoretical Implications 
 Results of this study show how organizational support theory can be used to 
explain the relationship between safety climate, organizational citizenship behaviors, and 
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operational performance.  This research extends previous efforts of Lee et al. (2007), 
Michael et al. (2005), Podsakoff et al. (2000), and Somech and Drach-Zahavy (2004) by 
investigating the relationships between safety climate, organizational citizenship 
behaviors, and operational performance in one, concerted effort.  At the organizational 
level, having leaders that place safety over mission accomplishment and are firmly 
committed to providing a safe working environment, provide adequate safety training to 
all employees, and ensure safe and well-maintained vehicles and equipment are always 
available may help enhance employees’ perceived organizational support.  Furthermore, 
at the group level, having direct supervisors and coworkers that always enforce safety 
rules and set expectations that everyone must always be safe regardless of the workload 
may also help increase perceived organizational support.  The aforementioned aspects of 
organization and group-level safety climate lets the employees know that the organization 
genuinely cares about their well-being, and in turn, the employees may reciprocate by 
caring about the organization.  Organizational support theory informs us that an increase 
in perceived organizational support can lead to the employee incorporating the 
organization into their social identity, thus motivating the employees to work harder in 
order to help the organization meet its objectives.  Results of this research provide 
evidence of this through the relationship between safety climate and organizational 
citizenship behaviors.   
 Findings from this research also support Rhoades and Eisenberger’s (2002) belief 
that organizational support theory can be used to explain how perceived organizational 
support leads to increased employee job performance.   The organizational citizenship 
behavior dimensions of sportsmanship, civic virtue, and helping behavior were found to 
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be positively associated with self-reported operational performance of air transportation 
operations personnel in this study.  Although there are multiple studies that link safety 
climate to organizational citizenship behaviors and organizational citizenship behaviors 
to operational performance outcomes, no such study has been found that simultaneously 
links all of these constructs together.  Furthermore, no study has been found that 
investigates the relationship of multiple levels of safety climate with organizational 
citizenship behaviors.  Results point to a “safety chain” in which the organization’s safety 
policies and procedures have a large direct impact on group-level safety climate which, in 
turn, influences employee citizenship behavior.  As such, this research effort provides the 
first glimpse of how safety climate, through the lens of organizational support theory and 
the mediating effects of organizational citizenship behaviors, may actually enhance 
operational performance of employees in high-risk environments.   
3.6.2 Managerial Implications  
 From a managerial standpoint, this research helps leaders and first-line 
supervisors understand how their actions with regard to creating a climate of safety can 
enhance employee operational performance.  For organizational leaders, it is not enough 
to simply tell employees that you care about their safety.  Employee perceptions of OSC 
are formed through what the employee experiences.  Leaders must “walk-the-walk” and 
show through their actions that safety is more important than even mission 
accomplishment.  If employees are punished for delaying an aircraft due to a safety 
concern, this would send a mixed signal to the employee and possibly lead to a lower 
level of OSC.  Similarly, if organizational leadership fails to provide safe and appropriate 
vehicles or equipment, it could send a signal to the employees that safety is not a major 
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concern of the organization.  Once again, this could lead to lower levels of OSC which, 
as this research has shown, could lead to lower levels of GSC.  On the other hand, if 
employees believe organizational leaders are sincere in their commitment to safety, 
higher levels of OSC and GSC result, and this is associated with higher levels of OCBs 
and self-reported operational performance.   
 In similar fashion, first-line supervisors need to understand their daily actions 
influence GSC and impact OCB and self-reported operational performance as well.  By 
enforcing all safety rules and correcting unsafe behaviors even when injury or an accident 
has not occurred, first-line supervisors send a signal to employees that they are truly 
committed to safety.  But it is not only supervisors that can benefit from this research.  It 
was shown that coworkers play an important role in creating GSC as well.  When 
coworkers expect everyone to behave safely, when they ensure everyone uses the 
appropriate safety equipment for the job, and when they give impactful safety briefings to 
their workgroup, GSC is increased.  Results of this research showed that GSC was 
directly related to OCBs and indirectly influenced self-reported operational behaviors.  
By understanding that their attitudes towards being safe have impacts far beyond safety 
outcomes, leaders at all levels can see just how valuable creating a climate of safety can 
be.   
3.6.3 Limitations and Future Research 
 Some important limitations to this study and opportunities for future research 
must be addressed.  First, this study only included USAF air transportation specialists and 
the generalizability of results could be in question.  The tasks required of USAF air 
transportation specialists were identified and compared to the same occupation within the 
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US Air Reserve Component (Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve) and civilian air 
transportation operation companies, and these duties were found to be similar.  Although 
USAF air transportation specialists may be a proxy for the air transportation operations 
industry, replication of this study in other industries should be undertaken in order to 
enhance the generalizability of the findings.   
Further limitations to this research are the sole reliance on self-reported measures 
and the single method of data collection used.  Common method bias and social 
desirability may be a concern because of this.  To help address these potential limitations, 
an anonymous, web-based survey was chosen because research shows they may result in 
lower social desirability (Joinson, 1999).  Next, a short form of Hart et al.’s (2015) 
BIDR-16 social desirability scale was used to detect potential social desirability.  
Specifically, the impression management subscale was used.  The impression 
management subscale was modeled as a latent construct while letting the indicators of the 
OSC, GSC, OCB, and self-reported operational performance constructs to load onto it as 
well as their hypothesized constructs.  There are three advantages to using this type of 
analysis:  “1) allows measurement error in the factor to be estimated, 2) models the 
effects of the biasing factor on the measures themselves, and 3) does not constrain the 
effects of the methods factor on the individual measures to be equal” (Podsakoff et al., 
2003; 893-894).  No issues with social desirability were found with this analysis.  
Additionally, Harmon’s one-factor test was conducted with results pointing to a single 
method of data collection being an acceptable risk (Podsakoff et al., 2003).  Future 
research should incorporate objective performance data in the analysis to help triangulate 
results.   
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In addition to replicating this study in other industries, future research should be 
conducted to identify other variables, both mediators and moderators, that may play a 
role in the relationship between safety climate and operational performance.  
Furthermore, the opportunity exists to simultaneously investigate the effect that safety 
climate its potential mediators/moderators have on both safety and operational 
performance to gain a more complete picture of the relationship between safety and 
operations.   
In conclusion, the goal of this research was to investigate the effects of safety 
climate and OCBs on operational performance of air transportation operations personnel.  
It was found that safety climate did in fact influence OCBs, which in turn had a positive 
relationship with operational performance.  These promising results may help debunk the 
often-viewed idea that safety climate is in competition with productivity and provide the 
impetus for more research in this area.   
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IV. The Moderating Effect of Employee Perceptions of a Joint Management System 
on Safety Climate and Performance 
4.1 Introduction 
Past researchers have argued that a basic tradeoff exists between safety 
performance and competing priorities, such as productivity (Janssens et al., 1995; 
Wallace & Chen, 2006).  Researchers have also argued that this tradeoff may stem from a 
conflict between an organization’s safety rules and procedures and its productivity and 
efficiency objectives (Zohar, 2010).  These competing rules and objectives must be 
internalized by employees in order to determine which type of behaviors will get 
rewarded or supported in an organization.  This gives rise to the concept of safety 
climate, which can be defined as the perceptions employees have of the importance their 
organization places on safety (Zohar, 2010; Zohar & Luria, 2005).  Safety behaviors have 
a significant impact on safety performance and have been found to be significantly 
associated with actual safety mishaps (Griffin & Neal, 2000; Mearns et al., 2001; Mearns 
et al., 2003; Mearns et al., 2010).  Perceptions of safety climate have been shown to be a 
robust predictor of safety behaviors (Zohar, 2010).  Wallace and Chen (2006) argued that 
when employees hold perceptions of high levels of safety climate, they are less likely to 
be focused on accomplishing work objectives quickly and more focused on following the 
rules and regulations.  This focus can lead to workers behaving more safely but hindering 
production performance.  This coincides with Zohar and Luria’s (2005) conclusion that a 
fundamental conflict exists between production speed and safety precautions. 
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Although some researchers believe there is a negative relationship between 
productivity and safety performance, few studies exist that examine this phenomenon.  
The lack of integrated research was first highlighted by Brown (1996) when she 
mentioned that despite workplace safety being a growing concern for operations 
managers, safety was practically non-existent in the operations literature.  Brown (1996) 
called for researchers to include safety as a central theme in future operations 
management research.  It is now more than twenty years later; however, safety and 
operational outcomes have still been largely examined in isolation of each other (Das et 
al., 2008, Pagell et al., 2014, Pagell et al., 2015).  Even so, theoretical and empirical 
evidence does exist that shows safety performance and productivity can coexist in an 
organization in such a manner that safe organizations can be more productive than unsafe 
organizations (Pagell et al., 2014, Pagell et al., 2015, Tompa et al., 2016).   
The idea that safe organizations can be more productive than unsafe organizations 
may especially hold true in high-risk industries in which safety mishaps could have 
catastrophic consequences.  In these types of industries, organizational outcomes are 
increasingly dependent upon highly interdependent sets of tasks which are performed 
under conditions of uncertainty and time constraints (Gittell, 2006).   One such high-risk 
industry in which safety and productivity may be able to coexist is the airline industry.  A 
successful flight depends on the safe and effective coordination between multiple groups 
such as pilots, aircraft mechanics, ramp agents, and cargo handlers (Gittell, 2006).  An 
operational or safety failure by any one of these stakeholders could lead to an aircraft 
delay, unsatisfied customers, or a flight mishap.  For instance, the National 
Transportation Safety Board concluded that improperly secured cargo broke free from its 
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restraints during flight and caused the crash of a National Air Cargo, Inc.-operated 
Boeing 747-400 aircraft on April 29, 2013, killing seven crew members (NTSB, 2015).  
A lack of standardized cargo handling procedures and inadequate training for cargo 
loaders and cargo handling inspectors contributed to this tragedy (NTSB, 2015).  As a 
result of the incident, National Air Cargo, Inc. was fined $77,000 by the Federal Aviation 
Administration and ordered by a jury to pay more than $115 million to the families of 
deceased crew members (Bilyk, 2017; Page, 2015).  Furthermore, the company filed for 
bankruptcy protection in October 2014 (Air Cargo News, 2014).  It is not a far reach to 
conclude that if the cargo were safely loaded onto the aircraft, the aircraft might have 
successfully performed its operational mission and averted a great tragedy.  Results of the 
aforementioned situations suggest that the long-held belief of safety and productivity 
being incongruent may be inaccurate.  Rather, safety and productivity in high-risk 
organizations may in fact be complementary and dependent upon an organizational 
culture that is simultaneously supportive of both safety and operational performance.  
Specifically, when these high-risk industries are characterized by multiple groups with 
interdependent tasks, the existence of a joint management system (JMS) may hold the 
key to simultaneously achieving safe and effective operations.  This is because a JMS is a 
system that simultaneously measures, controls, and continuously improves both safety 
and operations (Pagell et al., 2015).   Whereas safety climate survey measure employee 
perceptions of the importance an organization places on safety versus competing factors 
such as productivity, safety climate surveys do not capture the relative importance an 
organization places on safety versus production.  However, the perceptions of the 
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presence of a JMS could indicate whether an employee believes a balance exists between 
safety and productivity in an organization.    
Therefore, through the lens of relational coordination theory, this research seeks 
to evaluate the influence of a JMS on both safety and operational performance.  
Specifically, we investigate the moderating effect of a JMS on the relationship between 
employee perceptions of safety climate, their safety behaviors, and individual operational 
performance.  The current study adds to the body of knowledge in multiple ways.  First, 
previous JMS research relied on safety and operational managers’ opinions on whether or 
not a JMS existed in the organization.  Using employees’ perceptions of whether or not a 
JMS exists has yet to be studied.  Pagell et al. (2015) state that the only way to truly 
assess if a JMS exists would be to collect data from the operational workers themselves.  
After all, it has been found that employee perceptions of the environment, rather than the 
environment itself, is what affects behavioral responses (James & Jones, 1974; James et 
al., 1978).  Next, Pagell et al. (2015) have called for future JMS research to incorporate 
leading indicators of safety due to incident data being incomplete and lagging.  Lagging 
indicators are reactionary in nature and, therefore, can be a poor gauge of prevention.  
Leading indicators, on the other hand, are measures that precede or indicate a future 
event.  Safety climate has been found to be a robust predictor of safety incidents across a 
wide variety of industries and is a strong leading indicator of safety behavior and 
performance (Barling et al., 2002; Fogarty & Shaw, 2010; Griffin & Neal, 2000; Huang 
et al., 2007; Kelloway et al., 2006; Zohar, 2000; Zohar, 2002).  Utilizing safety climate in 
JMS research can help shed light on the importance of JMS in regards to preventing 
adverse safety behaviors and simultaneously improving operational performance.  This 
89 
study will also extend safety climate theory, in that some theorists still purport a tradeoff 
between safety and operational performance (Zohar, 2010).  This study proposes that 
when safety and operational objectives are given equal importance through the use of a 
JMS, the safety-productivity tradeoff can be balanced. 
4.2 Conceptual Background 
4.2.1 Safety Climate and Safety Behaviors 
 Safety climate has been shown to be a robust predictor of safety outcomes across 
a wide variety of industries (Zohar, 2010).  Safety climate theory has been developed and 
refined over the last 37 years and posits that employees, through the daily interactions 
and social exchanges with leadership and managers, can gain a sense of the importance 
the organization places on safety behaviors over other factors (Williams, Garver, & 
Stephen Taylor, 2011).  For instance, Kath et al. (2010) state that perceived management 
attitudes about safety, a key component of safety climate, can be considered a signal to 
employees that safe behaviors at work are an obligation and an employee citizenship 
behavior.  Therefore, if the worker feels supported and cared for by the organization, he 
or she may feel obliged to reciprocate by behaving safely.  In other words, when an 
employee feels the organization places a high value on safety, a higher safety climate is 
achieved.  This higher safety climate results in safer behavior and a decrease in safety 
incidents (Barling, et al., 2002; Fogarty & Shaw, 2010; Griffin & Neal, 2000; Huang et 
al., 2007; Kelloway et al., 2006; Zacharatos et al, 2005; Zohar, 2002; Zohar, 2003; Zohar 
& Luria, 2005; Zohar et al., 2014).   
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 One of the more important refinements to safety climate theory came from Zohar 
(2000) when he empirically tested a group-level model of safety climate, a model that 
was distinct from the organization-level safety climate model.  This model measured 
perceptions of supervisory safety practices in work groups instead of the enforced 
company policies and procedures found at the organization-level.  Results from this study 
supported the predictive validity of the new group-level safety climate measure, as the 
safety climate perceptions significantly predicted accident records during a 5-month 
follow-on period.  Zohar combined the group-level and organization-level safety climate 
constructs into an overarching multi-level safety climate model to depict that enforced 
safety policies and supervisory safety practices simultaneously effect safety climate at the 
organization and group level, which in turn influences safety behaviors and safety 
outcomes (Zohar, 2003).  More recently, Huang et al. (2013) developed a multi-level 
safety climate scale for truck drivers and found that organization and group-level safety 
climate were both significantly related to self-reported driving safety behaviors and 
actual injuries.  In the multi-level safety climate framework, top managers in the 
organization develop safety policies and procedures to achieve strategic objectives, and 
lower level supervisors are tasked with interpreting, implementing, and executing these 
safety procedures.  Since group-level supervisors are bound by the organization-level 
safety policies and procedures, it is expected that organization-level safety climate will be 
positively related to group-level safety climate (Zohar & Luria, 2005).  Based on the 
above discussion, the following relationships are hypothesized between organization and 
group-level safety climate and safety behaviors.    
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H1a. Organizational-level safety climate is positively related to group-level safety 
climate. 
 
H1b. Organizational-level safety climate is positively related to safety behaviors. 
 
H1c. Group-level safety climate is positively related to safety behaviors.  
 
H1d. Group-level safety climate will mediate the positive relationship between 
organization-level safety climate and safety behaviors. 
 
4.2.2 Safety Climate and Individual Operational Performance 
Although investigating the link between safety and operational performance is in 
its relative infancy, several theories have been used in recent literature to help explain the 
possible relationship between safety and productivity, namely social exchange theory, 
organizational support theory, and cognitive dissonance theory.  Michael et al. (2005) 
used social exchange theory and organizational support theory to link perceptions of 
management commitment to safety to individual employee performance in the wood 
manufacturing industry.  Michael et al. (2005) argued that employees will display 
positive behaviors such as improved performance in order to reciprocate the favorable 
treatment they receive from their employers.  The idea of reciprocity is a central theme to 
both social exchange and organizational support theory.  Social exchange theory 
describes the employee/employer relationship as a series of ongoing exchanges in which 
employees trade effort and loyalty for benefits such as a safe work environment 
(Williams et al., 2011).  Organizational support theory extends this relationship to say 
that employees use these social exchanges to form opinions on how much the employer 
values their contributions and well-being (Michael et al., 2005).  Michael et al. (2005) 
further state that these opinions are used to form an employee attitude called perceived 
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organizational support (POS), and that increases in POS motivate employees to work 
harder.  Thus, when the organization values the safety of an employee, the employee is 
driven to work harder for the organization which can lead to increased performance.  To 
test this relationship, Michael et al. (2005) surveyed 641 employees at three wood 
product manufacturing facilities to determine if there was a relationship between 
management commitment to safety and non-safety related outcomes such as job-related 
performance.  To assess performance, supervisors rated each of their subordinates on a 
number of performance measures such as “This employee completes all assigned duties”.  
Overall, the authors found that management commitment to safety and job-related 
performance were positively related.   
 Das et al. (2008) used cognitive dissonance theory to explain the relationship 
between safety and quality, which is an important indicator of operational performance.  
More specifically, the authors assessed the relationship between safety disconnect and 
quality.  Safety disconnect is defined by Das et al. (2008) as the difference in manager 
and worker perceptions regarding safety, and the authors note that disconnects, in 
general, have been associated with performance outcomes in numerous studies.  
Cognitive dissonance is the state of having inconsistent thoughts or opinions which result 
in an uncomfortable motivating feeling (Festinger, 1962).  These uncomfortable feelings 
will push individuals to act in ways to reduce the disconnect.  Das et al. (2008) believed 
employees would choose to ignore the managerial opinion and act on their own due to 
having a high stake in ensuring their own safety.  The authors further explained that when 
the safety disconnect is large, employees do not feel safe and they feel management is not 
addressing safety concerns.  This in turn leads to an employee losing motivation to be 
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involved in quality improvement activities and may result in lower worker effectiveness 
and quality of work.  This research sheds light on how disconnects between employee 
and managerial perceptions of safety can influence quality outcomes.  To test their 
hypotheses, Das et al. (2008) surveyed 144 workers from 19 manufacturing firms across 
the U.S. to test whether or not safety disconnects were related to the quality outcomes of 
scrap/rework and reliability/durability.  The authors found a significant negative 
relationship between safety disconnect and both quality indicators.  Based upon the above 
discussion, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
 
H2a. Organizational-level safety climate is positively related to individual operational 
performance. 
 
H2b. Group-level safety climate is positively related to individual operational 
performance.  
 
H2c. Group-level safety climate will mediate the positive relationship between 
organization-level safety climate and individual operational performance. 
 
4.2.3 Moderating Effects of a Joint Management System 
 JMS is linked in previous research to safety and operational performance, but its 
interaction effect with the relationship between safety climate and both safety behaviors 
and individual operational performance is currently unknown.  The theory of relational 
coordination (Gittell, 2002) provides the framework for understanding how a JMS can 
amplify safety climate’s effect on safety behaviors and individual operational 
performance.  This theory is centered on the belief that effective coordination occurs 
through relational and communication ties between workers with interdependent tasks, 
and that shared goals, shared knowledge, and mutual respect underlie the effective 
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coordination of work (Gittell, 2002).  In organizations where a JMS is present, employees 
work towards interdependent safety and operational goals rather than trying to optimize 
their own functional silos.  One of the main characteristics of a JMS is that safety and 
operational objectives are managed as an integrated process with no tension between the 
two, and this should lead to safe behaviors and effective operations.  Organizations with a 
high safety climate are characterized by having managers and coworkers that are 
committed to safety.  The managers do not subjugate safety to mission accomplishment, 
regardless of whether or not the workers are behind schedule.  Therefore, the expected 
outcomes on safety behaviors and operational performance for organizations with a high 
safety climate should be strengthened when that organization also has a JMS. 
Shared knowledge is also a necessary condition for effective coordination to 
occur (Gittell, 2006).  Shared knowledge enables employees to understand how their 
tasks interrelate with the entire production system and how the safety rules and 
procedures can help enhance organizational outcomes.  In organizations with a JMS, 
safety and operational knowledge are shared freely and both treated as knowledge of the 
production system (Pagell et al., 2015).  Each employee understands the overall work 
process and how their actions, with regard to safety and operations, can have an impact 
on employees in other functions.  In organizations with a high safety climate, employees 
should have a thorough knowledge of applicable safety policies and procedures, the 
employees receive comprehensive training on the vehicles and/or equipment they use to 
perform their jobs, and safety communication (i.e., safety briefings) occurs between the 
employees.  Consequently, the effects of these characteristics on safety behaviors and 
individual operational performance should be enhanced in the presence of a JMS. 
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Finally, mutual respect plays an important role in relational coordination theory 
because status boundaries can pose a threat to effective performance (Gittell, 2006).  
Gittell (2006) mentions that when members of different workgroups or occupations feel 
that they are more important or better than those of other workgroups or occupations, 
divisive relationships can form where coordination can be undermined.  Workgroups may 
focus on local optimization rather than the operational performance of the entire 
organization.  Pagell et al. (2015) explain that when a JMS is present, employees 
communicate more effectively with each other regardless of their status, and that mutual 
respect also means employees are less likely to take shortcuts to avoid causing instability 
in the production system.  When an organization has a high safety climate, employees 
work safely even when they may be behind schedule.  Mutual respect is shown because 
supervisors and coworkers do not put added pressure on the employee to rush through his 
or her job.  Furthermore, supervisors and coworkers expect everyone to work safely and 
correct any and all unsafe behavior regardless of status or position in the organization.  In 
an organization in which a high JMS is present, the beneficial effects of a high safety 
climate should be strengthened.  Therefore, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
 
H3a. JMS will moderate the relationship between organization-level safety climate and 
safety behaviors (i.e., stronger positive relationship under high JMS). 
 
H3b. JMS will moderate the relationship between group-level safety climate and safety 
behaviors (i.e., stronger positive relationship under high JMS). 
 
H4a. JMS will moderate the relationship between organization-level safety climate and 
individual operational performance (i.e., stronger positive relationship under high JMS). 
 
H4b. JMS will moderate the relationship between group-level safety climate and 
individual operational performance (i.e., stronger positive relationship under high JMS).  
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The conceptual model for this research is shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. Proposed theoretical model 
4.3 Methodology 
4.3.1 Data Collection 
This research was conducted using survey data collected from air transportation 
specialists assigned to 22 United States Air Force (USAF) organizations.  These 
organizations consisted of eight continental and six overseas USAF aerial port squadrons 
(APS) as well as eight continental USAF logistics readiness squadrons (LRS) in which 
air transportation specialists are assigned.  A list of current USAF APS’s was provided by 
the sponsor of the research, the USAF Air Mobility Command director of logistics 
(AMC/A4).  A total of 16 USAF APS’s were identified and invited to participate in the 
research.  Each USAF APS commander was contacted via telephone and email to 
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communicate the nature of the research and gain approval. Approval was obtained from 
14 commanders.  The commanders of the remaining two organizations did not respond to 
the request; therefore, those organizations were not included in the research.  To obtain a 
list of USAF LRS’s to include in the research, the logistics support branch of the USAF 
Installation and Mission Support Center (IMSC) was contacted.  The USAF IMSC 
provided a list of eight USAF LRS’s to include in the research.  These organizations were 
selected due to them having at least five air transportation specialists assigned.  Each of 
the organization’s commanders was contacted via telephone and email to gain approval 
for their personnel to participate in the research, and all commanders agreed to let their 
personnel participate.   
 All 2,456 air transportation specialists assigned to the 22 USAF organizations 
previously mentioned were invited to participate in this survey on a voluntary and 
confidential basis.  Each individual was sent an introductory email explaining the 
research followed up with an official survey invitation email that included a web link to 
the online survey.  A reminder email was sent out one week after the official survey 
invitation, and a final reminder email was sent one week later in accordance with 
accepted survey protocol (Fink, 2012; Neuman, 2011; Salant & Dillman, 1994).  No 
individual identifiers were collected for this study.  The average time of completion of 
the survey was approximately 21 minutes.  Furthermore, each respondent had the 
opportunity to be entered into a drawing for a $50 gift card upon completion of the 
survey.   
 Completed surveys were received from 340 air transportation specialists for a 
response rate of 13.8%; however, 22 responses were deemed unengaged respondents and 
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deleted.  The unengaged respondents were identified due to answering all Likert 
questions as a “7”.  No issues were found with missing responses in this study.  This 
resulted in a final sample of 318 responses (a 13% response rate).  To assess the 
characteristics of the sample relative to the population of air transportation specialists in 
the USAF, a comparison was made with regards to rank and age distribution (see Table 
13).  Results of a one sample proportion test showed that the sample was overrepresented 
by air transportation specialists in the non-commissioned officer (NCO) ranks of E-5 
though E-6 and underrepresented in the Airman (Amn) ranks of E-1 through E-4.  One 
reason for these results may be the fact that the air transportation specialist technical 
school was not included in the survey sample.  All new air transportation specialist Amn 
attend this technical school, and it consists primarily of personnel in the Amn ranks.  This 
organization was not included because it was not an operational organization.  Because of 
the differences between the sample and population, caution must be taken when 
generalizing the findings of this study beyond the current sample.  
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Table 13: USAF air transportation specialist sample and population comparison 
 Population Sample 
# 4530 318 
Age 27.6 29.0 
SD 6.4 6.2 
  Population Sample 
E-1 0.6% 0.8% 
E-2 3.1% 1.7% 
E-3 24.7% 14.7% 
E-4 22.9% 20.1% 
E-5 25.6% 30.5% 
E-6 13.8% 22.2% 
E-7 7.4% 9.2% 
E-8 1.3% 0.8% 
E-9 0.7% 0.0% 
 
4.3.2 Variables 
 To determine the role JMS plays with regard to safety climate’s effect on safety 
behaviors and individual operational performance, the following constructs were included 
in this research:  organization-level safety climate (OSC), group-level safety climate 
(GSC), JMS, self-reported safety behaviors, and self-reported operational performance.  
To measure OSC and GSC, air transportation operations-specific measurement scales 
recently developed and validated by the researcher were used.   
OSC was measured by a second-order, four-factor, 15-item scale that specifically 
measured the organization-level safety climate dimensions of management commitment 
to safety, safety policies and procedures, safety training, and vehicles and equipment.  
OSC measurement items were intended to capture perceptions of safety related to 
organizational leadership.  GSC was measured by a second-order, three-factor, 10-item 
scale that assessed the extent to which air transportation specialists agreed or disagreed 
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with statements concerning the GSC dimensions of commitment and support, work 
pressure, and safety briefings.  GSC measurement items were intended to capture 
perceptions of safety related to one’s immediate work group supervisor.  Both OSC and 
GSC were measured on a 7-point scale and can be found in Appendix C.1. 
 Self-reported operational performance was measured using five items from 
Williams and Anderson’s (1991) in-role performance scale.  This scale has previously 
been used in a variety of industries with Cronbach’s α ranging from .72 to .93 (Deckop et 
al., 2003; Hui & Law, 1999; Meyerson & Kline, 2008; Williams & Anderson, 1991).  
This measurement scale asked respondents to assess the extent to which they agreed or 
disagreed with statements concerning how well they perform their assigned duties.  
Sample items include “I fulfill responsibilities specified in my job description” and “I 
meet formal performance requirements of the job.”  The construct self-reported safety 
behaviors was measured using a 5-item scale intended to assess behavioral patterns that 
involve breaking rules and taking chances in core activities (Mearns et al., 2010).  These 
behaviors have been demonstrated to be significantly associated with safety violations 
and actual accident involvement at the individual and workgroup level (Mearns et al., 
2001; Mearns et al., 2003).  Therefore, safety behaviors is used a surrogate for safety 
performance in this study.  As was found with the operational performance scale, the 
safety behavior scale has been found to be reliable across many different industries with a 
Cronbach’s α ranging from .74 to .86 (Mearns et al., 2003; Mearns et al., 2010; Rundmo, 
1996; Rundmo, 2000).  A sample item from this scale includes “I get the job done better 
by ignoring some rules.”  Both operational and safety performance were measured on a 
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7-point scale, and a complete list of the measurement items can be found in Appendix 
C.1. 
Finally, JMS was measured using Tompa et al.’s (2016) four-factor, 13-item JMS 
scale.  Tompa et al.’s (2016) scale was based on Pagell et al.’s (2015) JMS scale and was 
intended to be administered to an organization’s operations manager and safety manager.  
The intent of the current research was to assess employee perceptions of the existence of 
a JMS; therefore, Dr. Mark Pagell reviewed each JMS scale item prior to it being used.  
This resulted in a five-factor, 15-item JMS scale with the factors consisting of process 
focus, monitoring of operations, monitoring of safety, design of work/hazard control, and 
frequency of communication of safety.  These factors previously resulted in Cronbach’s α 
ranging from .76 to .96 (Tompa et al., 2016).  An exploratory factor analysis (EFA) using 
principal axis factoring with direct oblimin rotation was performed to assess the 
dimensionality of the JMS construct since this is the first time JMS has been assessed at 
the employee level.  This resulted in a two-factor, 12-item JMS scale with the factors 
consisting of process focus and monitoring/hazard control/communication.  Results of the 
EFA are shown in Table 14.  The JMS items were measured using a 7-point scale and can 
be found in Appendix C.1.  Next, a cluster analysis was performed to identify the degree 
to which individuals perceived their organization had a JMS.  Overall JMS scores were 
standardized and then centroid-based clustering with a k-means algorithm was performed 
in SPSS (Hair et al., 2010).  To determine the appropriate number of clusters for the 
analysis, silhouette distance metrics were compared (Everitt et al., 2001).  Silhouette 
distances range from -1, indicating a very poor model, to 1, indicating an excellent 
model.  A silhouette distance metric of 0.5 or above indicates reasonable partitioning of 
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the data (Kaufman & Rousseeuw, 1990).  The silhouette distance metric declined from 
.68, to .52, to .24 as the number of clusters increased from two to four.  Thus, a two-
cluster solution was justified with individuals having either a high (219) or low (99) 
perception of the existence of a JMS.   
Internal reliability of the scales was assessed using Cronbach’s α, and scores 
ranged from .73 to .92 (shown in Table 16), which is beyond the recommended level of 
0.70 for general research (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994).  To investigate the presence of 
common method bias, Harmon’s one-factor test was used (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986).  
This test resulted in nine factors accounting for 68.3% of the variance, with the first 
factor accounting for 36.0%.  No single factor emerged, and no factor accounted for most 
of the variance, which leads to the conclusion that common method bias was not a major 
concern with this data (Podsakoff et al., 2003).  Finally, a non-response bias test was 
conducted to compare the responses of early and late respondents and to compare the 
results of APS versus LRS respondents.  For the early versus late respondents, groups 
were separated into those that responded to the first email versus those that responded to 
follow-up emails.  An independent t-test analysis, with the type I error rate for analysis 
set to 0.50, was used to determine if there were statistically significant differences 
between responses of the two groups.  Results showed that there was a significant 
difference in responses to only one out of 50 items (JMSHC1, p = .017) for early versus 
late respondents.  When comparing APS responses to LRS responses, a significant 
difference was found for five out of 50 items (GSB1, p = .015; OVE1, p = .001; OVE2, p 
= .001; SB4, p = .019; SB5, p = .007).  Based on the above results, it was concluded that 
non-response bias was not a significant concern in this study. 
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Table 14: EFA results for JMS 
 Factor 
  F1 F2 
F1: Process focus (CA = 0.76)   
JMSPF1 - 0.61 
JMSPF2 - 0.50 
JMSPF3 - 0.56 
JMSPF4 - 0.76 
   
F2: Monitoring, hazard control and communication (CA = 0.93)   
JMSHC1 0.54 - 
JMSHC2 0.79 - 
JMSHC3 0.78 - 
JMSHC4 0.85 - 
JMSHC5 0.91 - 
JMSHC6 0.77 - 
JMSHC7 0.75 - 
JMSHC8 0.77 - 
   
Eigenvalues 6.69 1.30 
Percentage Variance 55.77 10.87 
Cumulative Variance 55.77 66.64 
Note: Numbers in boldface indicate dominant factor loadings.  
 
4.4 Analysis and Results 
 A combination of SPSS and AMOS 18.0, using the maximum likelihood 
estimation method, was used for the analysis.  The type I error rate for analyses was set to 
0.05 for this research.  Anderson and Gerbing’s (1988) two-step procedure was used to 
test the proposed model.  A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was performed first to 
assess convergent and discriminant validity.  Next, the structural model was analyzed to 
test the proposed hypotheses. 
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4.4.1 Measurement Model Results 
 To assess convergent and discriminant validity, a CFA was performed using 
AMOS 18.0.  The constructs representing OSC, GSC, IP and SB were included in the 
CFA.  The measurement model resulted in the following fit indices:  χ2 (1047.86, df = 
543, p-value < .001); comparative fit index (CFI) (.93); incremental fit index (IFI) (.93); 
standardized root mean residual (SRMR) (.06); and root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA) (.054, 90% CI (.049, .059)).  The fit indices indicate an 
adequate model fit with the exception of the χ2 statistic (Hu & Bentler, 1999).  Although 
a significant χ2 statistic was obtained, the normed χ2 statistic was 1.93 which fell well 
below the recommended maximum of 3.0 (Kline, 2011).   
 To test for convergent validity, factor loadings were assessed along with the 
average variance extracted (AVE) for each construct.  Standardized factor loadings and 
AVEs are shown in Table 15.  All items loaded onto their corresponding constructs with 
p < .001, and all but two variables had factor loadings exceeding the recommended 0.6 
threshold recommended by Hair et al. (2010).  Individual performance had two items out 
of five that were significantly lower than the 0.60 threshold (OP1 & OP5).  No remedial 
measures were taken for these items.  The rule of thumb for using AVE to assess 
convergent validity is 0.5 which means that the variance explained by the construct is 
greater than what is due to measurement error (Hair et al., 2010).  All constructs had 
AVEs above the 0.50 threshold.  Results of the above analyses provide evidence that 
convergent validity was achieved.  
 Discriminant validity was assessed by performing the Fornell and Larcker (1981) 
test.  According to this test, discriminant validity is supported if the square root of a 
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construct’s AVE is greater than the correlations between that construct and other 
constructs used in the model.  As shown in Table 16, all constructs passed this test, which 
provides evidence of discriminant validity.  In conclusion, the measurement model results 
give sufficient support to allow for the evaluation of the structural model and detailed 
hypotheses testing. 
Table 15: Results of CFA 
Constructs and scale items Factor loadings Construct and scale items Factor loadings 
Management commitment to safety (AVE = 0.61) Work pressure (AVE = 0.56) 
  OMC1 0.66   GWP1 0.79 
  OMC2 0.78   GWP2 0.73 
  OMC3* 0.88   GWP3* 0.72 
Safety policies and procedures (AVE = 0.57) Safety briefings (AVE = 0.53)  
  OSP1 0.80   GSB1 0.62 
  OSP2 0.76   GSB2 0.78 
  OSP3* 0.71   GSB3* 0.77 
Safety training (AVE = 0.67) Operational performance (AVE = 0.54) 
  OT1 0.90   OP1* 0.54 
  OT2 0.88   OP2 0.88 
  OT3* 0.82   OP3 0.89 
  OT4 0.74   OP4 0.87 
  OT5 0.84   OP5 0.29 
  OT6 0.72 Safety behaviors (AVE = 0.66) 
Vehicles and equipment (AVE = 0.63)   SB1* 0.76 
  OVE1 0.80   SB2 0.79 
  OVE2 0.70   SB3 0.86 
  OVE3* 0.87   SB4 0.87 
Management commitment and coworker support (AVE = 0.61)   SB5 0.76 
  GMCS1 0.80  
  GMCS2 0.79   
  GMCS3* 0.78   
  GMCS4 0.74   
Notes: All t-values were significant at the p < .001 level 
* indicates item was fixed to 1 to set the scale 
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Table 16: Means, standard deviations, reliability, AVE, and correlations 
Construct Mean SD CA AVE OMC OSP OT OVE GMCS GWP GSB OP SB 
OMC 5.77 1.14 0.81 0.61 0.78         
OSP 5.63 1.17 0.79 0.57 0.53 0.75        
OT 5.29 1.28 0.92 0.67 0.48 0.6 0.82       
OVE 5.14 1.45 0.84 0.63 0.48 0.48 0.6 0.79      
GMCS 6.04 0.90 0.89 0.61 0.4 0.47 0.59 0.48 0.78     
GWP 4.76 1.45 0.78 0.56 0.5 0.31 0.36 0.3 0.39 0.75    
GSB 5.56 1.13 0.76 0.53 0.41 0.44 0.59 0.39 0.62 0.29 0.73   
OP 6.25 0.62 0.73 0.54 0.25 0.23 0.25 0.22 0.19 0.2 0.15** 0.73  
SB 5.58 1.22 0.90 0.66 0.4 0.52 0.38 0.37 0.46 0.41 0.35 0.16** 0.81 
Notes: p < .001 level unless otherwise noted; ** = p < .01 
square root of AVE shown on diagonal 
 
4.4.2 Structural Model Results 
All hypotheses were tested via structural equation modeling using the maximum 
likelihood method in Amos 18.  Mediation hypotheses were evaluated using the bootstrap 
test of indirect effects as suggested by Zhao et al. (2010).  This was accomplished using 
5,000 re-samples with replacement using Shrout and Bolger’s (2002) bias-corrected 
bootstrap method to determine the product of the mediation pathway with a 95% 
confidence interval.  Moderation hypotheses were evaluated using Baron and Kenny’s 
(1986) multi-group analysis method in AMOS 18 using the high and low JMS clusters as 
groups.  The structural model presented in Figure 6 provided an overall acceptable fit (χ2 
= 998.894; df = 546; p < .001; CFI = 0.93; IFI = 0.93; SRMR = .06; RMSEA = .051 with 
a 90% CI of (0.46, 0.56)).  Although a significant χ2 statistic was obtained, the normed χ2 
statistic was 1.829 which fell below Kline’s (2011) recommended maximum level of 3.0.  
Thus the structural model results were deemed acceptable for hypothesis testing.  Results 
of the hypotheses tests follow and are presented in Tables 17 and 18.  
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As expected, OSC was significantly related to GSC (γ = .811, z = .086, p < .001), 
lending support for H1a.  H1b predicted a positive relationship between OSC and safety 
behaviors.  However, results of the model suggest the direct path between OSC and SB is 
not significant (γ = .386, z = .247, p = .118), which leads to H1b being rejected.  H1c 
predicted a positive relationship would exist between GSC and safety behaviors, and this 
hypothesis was supported (β = 1.037, z = .122, p < .001).  It was posited that GSC would 
mediate the positive relationship between OSC and safety behavior.  Although no direct 
relationship was found between OSC and safety behavior, it was still possible that GSC 
could fully mediate the relationship between OSC and safety behaviors.  According to 
Zhao et al. (2010), a significant indirect effect is all that is needed to establish mediation.  
Results of the mediation analysis provided support for H1d, which stated that GSC fully 
mediates the relationship between OSC and safety behaviors (.807 [.624, 1.154], p < 
0.001).  Although it was hypothesized that GSC would partially mediate the relationship 
between OSC and safety behaviors, the analysis showed a fully mediated relationship.  
This fully mediated relationship is similar to results found in previous safety climate 
research (Zohar & Luria, 2005). 
Hypotheses H2a and H2b postulated that OSC and GSC would be positively 
related to operational performance.  The data did not support H2a as OSC was not 
significantly related to operational performance (γ = .273, z = .145, p < .059).  
Conversely, the data did support the theoretical assertion that higher levels of GSC are 
related to higher levels of operational performance (β = .287, z = .052, p < .001).  To test 
for the mediated path as hypothesized by H2c, Shrout and Bolger’s (2002) bias-corrected 
bootstrap method was once again performed.  This hypothesis was supported as a 
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statistically significant indirect path was found from OSC to operational performance 
(.223 [.136, .387], p < 0.001).  Once again, GSC fully mediated this relationship.  
Although H1b, H1c, H2b, and H2c were supported, it is not clear whether these 
hypotheses hold for different levels of JMS.  Specifically, would these relationships hold 
true for individuals that have high versus low perceptions of the existence of a JMS?   
Table 17: Structural Equation Model Results 
Structural path Hypothesis Effect SE p-value LCL UCL Supported 
OSC  GSC H1a 0.811 0.086 0.001 --- --- Yes 
OSC  SB H1b 0.273 0.247 0.118 --- --- No 
GSC  SB H1c 1.037 0.122 0.001 --- --- Yes 
OSC  GSC  SB* H1d 0.841 0.133 0.001 0.624 1.154 Yes 
OSC  OP H2a 0.273 0.145 0.059 --- --- No 
GSC  OP H2b 0.287 0.052 0.001 --- --- Yes 
OSC  GSC  OP* H2c 0.232 0.061 0.001 0.136 0.387 Yes 
Note:  Bootstrap upper and lower confidence intervals for the indirect effects; * paths were fully mediated 
 
Prior to performing a multi-group analysis, it is necessary to establish configural 
and metric invariance (Goldsby et al., 2013; Vandenberg & Lance, 2000).  This is to 
ensure that any findings are due to attitudinal differences versus different psychometric 
responses (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002).  Configural invariance is demonstrated through 
performing a multi-group confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA).  Resultant models 
from the MGCFA with data split according to JMS group preserved an adequate fit for 
the data (χ2 = 1800.231; df = 1088; p < .001; CFI = 0.88; IFI = 0.88; SRMR = .071; 
RMSEA = .046 with a 90% CI of (0.42, 0.49)).  Evidence of configural invariance was 
achieved.  Metric invariance is demonstrated by performing a χ2 test between a fully 
unconstrained model and a model that constrains factor loadings on the constructs to be 
equal.  Metric invariance is achieved if there is no significant difference in the χ2 test 
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between the two models.  If a significant difference is found between the χ2 tests, it is an 
indication that there are differences between the factor loadings for the different groups.  
The χ2 (1805.083; df = 1094) of the unconstrained baseline model was significantly 
different than the χ2 (1883.384; df = 1120) of the model with constrained factor loadings 
(p < .001) suggesting the estimated parameters are not invariant across the two groups.  
However, a χ2 test was then performed constraining one parameter at a time to identify 
which factor loadings were not invariant.  Results indicated that a total of six factor 
loadings out of 35 were not invariant across the groups (OVE2, GMCS1, GSB3, SB1, 
OP4, and OP5).  Furthermore, every construct had at least one item that was invariant 
across groups.  Thus, partial invariance was established and moderation analysis can 
proceed because one or more items from each latent construct is metrically invariant 
(Byrne et al., 1989).   
 It was hypothesized that the relationship between OSC and safety behaviors 
would be stronger when employees’ perceptions of the existence of a JMS were high 
(H3a).  It was also hypothesized that the relationship between GSC and safety behaviors 
would be moderated by perceptions of a JMS (H3b).  It was posited that the perception of 
the existence of a JMS would also moderate the relationship between OSC and 
operational performance (H4a).  Finally, H4b hypothesized that the relationship between 
GSC and operational performance would be moderated by the perception of the existence 
of a JMS.  Since no direct relationship was found between OSC and safety behaviors or 
operational performance, H3a and H4a were rejected (Baron & Kenny, 1986).  To test 
H3b and H4b, a multi-group analysis was performed.  An unconstrained base model was 
first formed, and then equality constraints were imposed to determine whether 
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constraining the path coefficients to be equal across the moderator subgroups would have 
a statistically significant impact on model fit (Jaccard & Wan, 1996; Jöreskog & Sörbom, 
1996).  A moderation effect is present if there is a significant difference in χ2.   
 The results of the moderation analysis are presented in Table 18.  Although the 
path coefficients differ across JMS groups for GSC to safety behaviors (low JMS: β = 
.743, z = .271, p = .006; high JMS: β = 1.117, z = .210, p = .001), there was no significant 
difference in χ2 across the groups (Δχ2(1) = .954, p = .329).  Thus, no moderation effect 
was found and H3b was rejected.  Conversely, the relationship between GSC and 
operational performance was found to be dependent upon the JMS group (Δχ2(1) = 9.103, 
p = .003).  These results indicate that GSC is positively related to operational 
performance only when a high perception of a JMS exists (β = .452, z = .092, p < .001).  
No statistical relationship exists between GSC and operational performance in the low 
JMS group (β = -.045, z = .120, p = .709).  In conclusion, support was found for H4b. 
Table 18: Results of multi-group moderation analyses 
Hypothesis Path Moderator Model Level Path Coefficient (p) Δ χ2 (p) 
H3b GSC --> SB JMS Equal across group Low 1.015 (.001) Con: 1806.037 
    High 1.015 (.001) Base: 1805.083 
   Free across group Low .743 (.006) Diff: .954 (.329) 
    High 1.117 (.001)  
H4b GSC  OP JMS Equal across group Low .345 (.001) Con: 1814.186 
    High .345 (.001) Base: 1805.083 
   Free across group Low -.045 (.709) Diff: 9.103 (.003) 
    High .452 (.001)  
Note: GSC = group safety climate; SB = safety behaviors; OP = operational performance; Con = constrained model; Base 
= unconstrained base model; Diff = difference between models 
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Figure 6. Final SEM model based on significant direct paths  
*** p < .001; SMC = squared multiple correlation 
4.5 Discussion 
 Although some researchers have argued that a tradeoff exists between safety and 
operational performance, there is a lack of integrated research that tests this belief.  The 
purpose of this study was to address the call for simultaneous safety and operations 
research and investigate whether perceptions of the existence of a JMS could play a role 
in strengthening the relationship between safety climate and both safety and operational 
performance.  Results presented in this study indicate that organization-level safety 
climate is significantly related to group-level safety climate, and both levels of safety 
climate are positively related to safety behaviors.  Neither of these relationships differed 
based on JMS grouping.  In the case of organization-level safety climate, the relationship 
with safety behaviors was fully mediated by group-level safety climate.  This fully 
OSC GSC SMC = .79 
Individual 
Operational 
Performance 
 SMC = .13 
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Behaviors 
SMC = .38 
JMS High: .45*** 
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mediated path between organization-level safety climate, group-level safety climate, and 
safety behaviors is consistent with the findings of other safety climate research (Zohar & 
Luria, 2005).  The fully mediated path may be a result of the hierarchical organization 
structure of the organizations included in this research.  Group-level safety climate was 
assessed by asking employees questions that specifically related to their immediate 
supervisor and coworkers, whereas organization-level safety climate was assessed by 
asking employees about their organization-level leaders.  Employees noted that they had 
daily interactions with their immediate supervisors; however, interactions with 
organization-level leadership were much less frequent.  For instance, one respondent 
commented that they had not seen his organization-level leadership in over two months.  
This physical separation between employees and organization leadership may help 
explain why organization-level leadership had no direct effect on safety behaviors.  
However, organization-level safety climate did explain 79% of the variance in group-
level safety climate.  This could signify that organization-level leaders are effectively 
conveying their strategic safety policies and procedures to the first-line supervisors.     
This research also found that organization and group-level safety climate are 
positively related to self-reported operational performance.  Once again, group-level 
safety climate fully mediated the relationship between organization-level safety climate 
and operational performance.  However, group-level safety climate was found to be 
related to operational performance only when employees also had a high perception of 
the existence of a JMS in their organization.  When employees did not have a high 
perception of the existence of a JMS, there was no significant link between group-level 
safety climate and operational performance.  This finding indicates that when certain 
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conditions are met in high-risk environments, it is possible for safety climate to be 
positively related to both safety and operational performance.  Thus, the idea of a tradeoff 
between safety and operations is perhaps negated in this context.  This phenomenon may 
exist because a JMS is characterized as a system that links safety management and 
operations management together (Pagell et al., 2015).  The production system is 
continuously monitored to ensure risks to both operational effectiveness and safety are 
identified and controlled.  Furthermore, safety and operational objectives are 
simultaneously monitored.  Therefore, in the presence of a JMS, there is no implied 
conflict between being safe or operationally efficient.  Maybe more importantly, in the 
presence of a JMS, neither safety nor operations is subjugated to the other.  They are 
given equal billing and the result is the ability for safety climate to lead to increased 
safety and operational performance.   
4.5.1 Theoretical Implications 
 This study advances the understanding of how important a role JMS may play in 
the relationship between safety climate, safety behaviors, and operational performance of 
employees in high-risk organizations.  Through the lens of relational coordination theory 
(Gittell, 2002), it was discovered that when employees perceive high levels of a JMS, 
simultaneous increases in safety behaviors and operational performance can be achieved.  
Although organizations with a high level of safety climate are characterized by having 
managers and coworkers that are committed to safety, this alone was not enough to have 
an impact on operational performance.  To translate safety climate into operational 
performance, employees first had to perceive that there was no conflict between 
operational and safety objectives.  Employees also had to have a firm understanding of 
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how safety rules and procedures fit into the production system and how the rules and 
procedures enhance organizational outcomes.  Effective communication had to take place 
in regards to how the organization was meeting its safety and operational goals.  Finally, 
there was no added pressure to work unsafely when work fell behind schedule.  These are 
all aspects of a JMS and are also the foundation of the relational coordination theory 
concepts of shared goals, shared knowledge, and mutual respect.       
 Previous JMS research assessed the existence of a JMS through the viewpoint of 
operations and safety managers and focused on organization-level outcomes (Pagell et 
al., 2014; Pagell et al., 2015; Tompa et al., 2016).  This study adds to the body of 
knowledge of JMS by incorporating individual employee perceptions of the existence of 
a JMS.  Although managers may believe a JMS is present in an organization, the only 
way to be sure if the concepts of a JMS are reaching the employees is to ask the 
employees themselves (Pagell et al., 2015).  By using employee perceptions of the 
existence of a JMS, this study enhances previous JMS research findings and solidifies the 
link between JMS and both operational and safety outcomes.  The findings of this 
research provide evidence of how safety climate theory and relational coordination theory 
can complement each other in relating safety climate to operational and safety outcomes. 
4.5.2 Managerial Implications 
 This research also provides important insights for managers of high-risk 
organizations where accidents can have catastrophic consequences.  It was found that 
safety climate was not necessarily indicative of a conflict between safety and 
productivity.  In other words, managers do not have to be tempted to eschew safety out of 
fear that productivity will suffer.  Instead, through the use of a JMS, simultaneous 
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increases in safety behavior and operational performance are possible.  To achieve this 
and ensure the individual employee believes a JMS is present, managers should ensure 
that the jobs the employees perform are well defined and standardized when possible.  
Also, managers should actively monitor the production system to ensure both safety risk 
and risks to operational effectiveness are identified and controlled.  Both safety and 
operational objectives should be monitored and both should be given equal billing.  
Finally, these goals should be frequently communicated to the workers to ensure they 
understand the importance of both operations and safety to the organization.   
 Managers could also use employee perceptions of a JMS as a feedback 
mechanism to determine if a JMS has been effectively implemented in the organization.  
If the organization believes a JMS is in place, low scores on the JMS scale could indicate 
that there may be disconnects between organizational policies and actual practice.  These 
disconnects could serve as a signal for organizational leaders to review their operational 
and safety management policies and help them develop communication and 
implementation strategies to ensure those policies are being implemented effectively 
throughout the organization.  Overall, adopting a JMS and ensuring it is effectively 
implemented in the organization may help leaders simultaneously achieve better safety 
and operational outcomes. 
4.5.3 Limitations and Future Research 
 Although this research may have important theoretical and managerial 
implications, it is not without limitations.  First, responses in this study are limited to 
organizations in the military air transportation operations environment.  Although the 
duties required of the personnel included in the study are similar to those in the civilian 
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air transportation operations industry, replication of this study in other high-risk 
organizations should be undertaken to enhance the generalizability of the research.  Also, 
as previously mentioned, the military organizations included in this study had a 
hierarchical organization structure, and this structure may have played a role in the fully 
mediated paths between organization-level safety climate, group-level safety climate, and 
safety behaviors.  It would be interesting to assess whether this relationship would hold 
for organizations with a flatter organization structure. 
Next, future studies should incorporate the entire domain of the JMS construct.  
Accountability, continuous improvement in operations, and human resource management 
are dimensions that were not used in the current study.  These dimensions were left out of 
the current study because they were previously found to not be reliable, and including 
them would have increased the survey instrument by 14 items (Pagell et al., 2015).  
Although the dimensions were not found to be reliable in a previous study, it would be 
interesting to discover their applicability to high-risk organizations.  Future research 
should include all potential dimensions of a JMS in order to further our understanding of 
this important construct.   
  Another limitation of this study was the reliance on self-reported measures.  Self-
reported data can lead to threats to reliability and validity due to bias (Roxas & Lindsay, 
2012).  To address this, Harmon’s one-factor test and a non-response bias test were 
conducted, and it was concluded that neither common method bias nor non-response bias 
were a concern.  Also, although this study focused on individual perceptions and 
employee outcomes, actual operational data would enhance the findings.  Future research 
should include actual individual operational and safety performance data to determine if 
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the relationships hold, and to investigate if the hard data are related to employee 
perceptions of safety and operational performance.  Moreover, testing a multi-level 
model to investigate the effects of a JMS on group and organization-level safety and 
operational outcomes may reveal some interesting findings.   
In conclusion, the goal of this research was to investigate the role a JMS plays in 
the relationship between safety climate and both safety and operational performance.  
Although JMS did not have an effect on group safety climate’s positive relationship with 
safety behaviors, it was found that group safety climate was positively related to 
operational performance, if and only if, employees perceive a high level of JMS exists in 
the organization.  This suggests that JMS may be a mechanism for translating safety 
climate into simultaneous increases in safety and operational performance in high-risk 
organizations.   
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V. Conclusion 
 The research presented in this dissertation focused on developing an air 
transportation operations safety climate scale and investigating the construct’s 
relationships with safety and non-safety related outcomes.  A multi-level safety climate 
measurement scale was created that captures perceptions of organization and group-level 
safety climate.  It was discovered that both levels of safety climate play an important role 
in influencing safety behaviors of air transportation operations personnel.  Additionally, it 
was found that creating a climate of safety and balancing it with operational objectives in 
high-risk organizations can lead to simultaneous increases in safety behaviors and 
operational performance.  The goal of this research was to provide actionable safety-
related intelligence to air transportation leaders.  Although a more detailed discussion can 
be found in each chapter, a summary of original contributions and suggestions for future 
research follows.    
5.1 Original Contributions 
 Chapter II developed and validated the first known safety climate scale for the air 
transportation operations industry.  Zohar (2010) called for expanding safety climate 
theory by developing industry specific safety climate scales to uncover context-specific 
intricacies.  This tool may be able to serve as a leading indicator for safety mishaps in the 
air transportation operations industry.  Furthermore, the scale developed in this chapter 
may help diagnose organizations with perceived safety climate and identify ways to help 
improve this climate.  Chapter II provided strong statistical and theoretical support for 
level-adjusted safety climate scales in the air transportation operations industry. 
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Chapter III extended the work accomplished in Chapter II by using the newly 
developed safety climate scale to investigate the relationship between safety climate and 
non-safety related outcomes in high-risk environments such as air transportation 
operations.  This is the first known study to investigate a multi-level safety climate 
framework to operational performance through OCBs.  It was found that group-level 
safety climate was positively related to OCBs, and that OCBs fully mediated the positive 
relationship between group-level safety climate and individual operational performance.  
Organization-level safety climate was found to a positive relationship with OCBs through 
the fully mediated effects of group-safety climate.  This research helps organizational 
leaders and first-line supervisors understand how their actions with regard to creating a 
climate of safety can enhance employee operational performance.     
Chapter IV provided empirical evidence that balancing the safety versus 
operational performance tradeoff can result in simultaneous increases in safety behavior 
and operational performance in high-risk organizations.  It was discovered that employee 
perceptions of a JMS moderated the relationship between group-level safety climate and 
individual operational performance.  This is the only known study to use employee 
perceptions of the existence of a JMS.  Previous research relied on inputs from operations 
and safety mangers and conceded that the only way to truly know if a JMS is present was 
to ask the employees themselves (Pagell et al., 2015).  As such, this study advances the 
understanding of how important a role JMS may play in the relationship between safety 
climate, safety behaviors, and operational performance of employees in high-risk 
organizations.  Additionally, this research demonstrates how safety climate theory and 
relational coordination theory can complement each other in relating safety climate to 
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operational and safety outcomes.  Finally, managers can use employee perceptions of a 
JMS as a feedback mechanism to determine if a JMS has been effectively implemented in 
the organization. 
5.2 Implications for US Air Force Leaders 
 In addition to the original contributions listed above and managerial implications 
discussed in each chapter, this research also has important implications for US Air Force 
leaders.  Results of this study may help the Air Force Safety Center transform the way in 
which it conducts safety climate studies in the future.  The newly developed safety 
climate scale can be utilized by the Air Force Safety Center and pilot tested in future 
safety climate assessments of US Air Force air transportation operations organizations.  
From the beginning, it has been shown that improvement in management attitudes and 
commitment towards safety are mandatory prerequisites for improving the safety in an 
organization (Zohar, 1980).  It has also been demonstrated that safety climate is a multi-
level framework that should be measured at the group and organization level.  Finally, 
Zohar (2010) has called for industry specific scales to be developed to better understand 
context-specific intricacies that may play a role in developing a climate of safety.  The 
scale developed in this study addresses each of these concerns.  The air transportation 
operations-specific safety climate scale is multi-dimensional and includes management 
attitudes and commitment towards safety at both the organization and group-level.  The 
value of this safety climate scale lies in its ability to assess employee perceptions of 
leadership commitment to safety at the current time and in the future.  And by developing 
a multi-dimension scale with clear frames of reference for the organization level and 
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workgroup level, leaders can pinpoint exactly where a deficiency may lie and react 
accordingly.  For instance, if it is found that the group-level safety climate sub-dimension 
of work pressure is a concern, leaders can take remedial measures to ensure group-level 
supervisors do not encourage workers to ignore safety rules when the workload builds up.  
The safety climate scale can be used to create a checklist to help correct any deficiencies 
that are found.  Finally, after validation by the Air Force Safety Center, industry specific 
safety climate scales can be developed and implemented for other Air Force career fields.   
5.3 Suggested Future Work 
This research has helped advance the understanding of the relationship that safety 
climate has with safety behaviors and operational performance of air transportation 
operations personnel.  The benefits of this research can be extended in many ways, and a 
few suggestions of future research are now presented.  First, US Air Force air 
transportation specialists were used as a proxy for this study, and this may hurt the 
generalizability of the findings.  To address this concern, the new air transportation 
operations safety climate scale should be validated by conducting a follow-up study that 
includes civilian air transportation operations personnel. 
 Also, this research relied solely on self-reported measurement scales for the 
outcome data.  Although common method and social desirability bias minimization and 
detection techniques were used in this study, future research should incorporate objective 
operational and safety outcome data to negate any potential common method bias and to 
triangulate results. 
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 Next, studies should be undertaken to investigate how safety climate is created 
within the air transportation operations environment.  This can be accomplished by 
including potential antecedents to safety climate in future research.  To date, investigating 
the antecedents of safety climate has not received much attention in the literature (Zohar, 
2010).  Supervisory leadership and symbolic social interaction are believed to be the two 
primary antecedents to safety climate, and further research is needed to identify the 
specific mechanisms in which they promote better safety climate.  One way this could be 
accomplished is by including a leadership measurement scale, such as authentic 
leadership, and investigating which scale items have the largest impact on each 
dimension of safety climate.  Results of a study such as this could be used to develop a 
training program for leaders and managers that could potentially help improve safety 
climate across an organization. 
 In addition to investigating antecedents of safety climate, introducing potential 
moderators and mediators that may play a role in the relationship between safety climate, 
safety behaviors, and operational performance should also be undertaken.  For instance, 
respect may play a significant role in these relationships.  During the interview portion of 
this research, it was mentioned on multiple occasions that an employee may go out of his 
or her way to behave more safely if that person has a lot of respect for their group and 
organizational leaders.  More interestingly, however, was that it was also said that if there 
was a lack of respect for leadership, the individual may perform his or her job in 
whichever way they felt best, even if it was in contrast to safety policies and procedures.  
The level of respect an employee has for their supervisor may moderate the relationship 
between safety climate and safety behaviors.  By including moderators and mediators in 
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future research efforts, important boundary conditions may be identified that help 
translate safety climate to safety behaviors and operational performance.  
 Finally, future research should further investigate the role a JMS plays in the 
relationship between safety climate, safety behaviors, and operational performance by 
including the entire domain of the JMS construct.  The dimensions of accountability, 
continuous improvement for operations, and human resource management were not used 
in the current study due to them being found unreliable in previous studies.  These 
dimensions should be refined, and the entire JMS construct should be tested in the air 
transportation operations industry as well as other high-risk industries.  It would also be 
interesting to extend the current research effort by using multi-level modeling techniques 
to investigate the effects of a JMS on group and organization-level safety and operational 
outcomes. 
 Although this research provides important contributions to understanding safety 
in the air transportation operations industry, there is still much more to be learned.  This 
should only be seen as the first step in air transportation operations safety research.  
Safety is, and will always remain, important and continued efforts to conduct research in 
this area should continue.   
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Appendix 
A.1 Potential Safety Climate Dimension Start List 
1. Management commitment to safety 
2. Safety priority 
3. Safety proactivity  
4. Work pressure 
5. Safety communication 
6. Safety systems 
7. Safety policies and procedures 
8. Worker involvement 
9. Competence 
10. Risk 
A.2 Safety Climate Interview Protocol 
Leadership/Safety Officer Interview Script 
1a. Talk to me about the most common safety-related decisions air transportation 
specialists make.  Are there ever disconnects between what they know is the right 
thing to do and what they feel they need to do to get the job done? 
 
1b. Can you provide me an example of one of those situations in which an air 
transportation specialist experienced a disconnect and had to make a difficult 
decision?  What was the outcome?  How do you think the outcome affected 
his/her future decision-making? 
 
1c. How do you think the air transportation specialist made the decision?  In other words, 
what things did he/she consider when making the decision? 
 
2.  What are some of the consequences (positive and negative) you think air 
transportation specialists consider when determining whether or not to make a 
safe decision? 
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3a. Think about the daily practices supervisors and leaders use to ensure air transportation 
specialists perform their duties (i.e., task assignment; allotted time to complete the 
task; follow-up).  What are some issues or things, with respect to those practices, 
that impact (either help or hurt) their abilities to make safe decisions? 
 
3b. Think about the safety policies and procedures air transportation specialists must 
abide by every day (PPE, HAZMAT use, TO use, etc.).  What are some issues or 
things, with respect to the policies, that impact (either help or hurt) their abilities 
to make safe decisions? 
 
3c. Think about the enforcement of the policies and procedures (leadership presence, QA, 
inspections, etc.).  What are some issues or things, with respect to enforcement, 
that impact (either help or hurt) air transportation specialists’ abilities to make 
safe decisions? 
 
4a. How responsible do you feel an individual is for their safety at work, and in what 
ways? 
 
4b. How responsible do you feel supervisors and leaders are for an individual’s safety at 
work, and in what ways? 
 
Technician Interview Script 
 
1a. Talk to me about the most common safety-related decisions you make.  Are there ever 
disconnects between what you know is the right thing to do and what you feel you 
need to do to get the job done? 
 
1b. Can you provide me an example of one of those situations in which you (or a fellow 
specialist) experienced a disconnect and had to make a difficult decision?  What 
was the outcome?  How did the outcome affect your (or the other person’s) future 
decision-making? 
 
1c. How did you make your decision?  In other words, what things did you consider when 
making the decision? 
 
2a. What are some of the consequences (positive and negative) you consider when 
determining whether or not to make a safe decision? 
 
2b. What are some of the consequences (positive and negative) you consider when 
determining whether or not to make an unsafe decision? 
 
3a. How responsible do you feel for your safety at work, and in what ways are you 
responsible? 
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3b. How responsible do you feel your supervisors and leaders are for your safety at work, 
and in what ways? 
 
4a. Think about the daily practices supervisors and leaders use to ensure you perform 
your duties (i.e., task assignment; allotted time to complete the task; follow-up).  
What are some issues or things, with respect to those practices, that impact (either 
help or hurt) your ability to make safe decisions? 
 
4b. Think about the safety policies and procedures air transportation specialists must 
abide by every day (wear PPE, HAZMAT use, TO use, etc.).  What are some 
issues or things, with respect to the policies, that impact (either help or hurt) your 
ability to make safe decisions? 
 
4c. Think about the enforcement of the policies and procedures (leadership presence, QA, 
inspections, etc.).  What are some issues or things, with respect to enforcement, 
that impact (either help or hurt) your ability to make safe decisions? 
 
A.3 Safety Climate Scale Items 
Respondents were asked to indicate on a scale from 1-7 the extent to which they 
agreed or disagreed with the following scale items.  The scale anchors were:  1 (strongly 
disagree), 2 (disagree), 3 (slightly disagree), 4 (neither agree nor disagree), 5 (slightly 
agree), 6 (agree), and 7 (strongly agree).   
 
Organization-level safety climate (OSC) 
 
Sub-dimension: management commitment to safety 
OMC1. Top management in my organization (squadron-level leadership) places safety 
over mission accomplishment. 
 
OMC2. Top management in my organization (squadron-level leadership) does not mind 
if an aircraft is delayed if it is due to safety. 
 
OMC3. Top management in my organization (squadron-level leadership) is strict about 
working safely even if work falls behind schedule. 
 
Sub-dimension: safety policies and procedures 
OSP1. Current Safety rules are easy to understand. 
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OSP2. Current safety rules help keep me safe (e.g., double hearing protection, use of 
spotters). 
 
OSP3. Current safety procedures reflect how the job is actually performed. 
 
Sub-dimension: safety training 
OT1. My organization provides thorough training on every piece of equipment and 
vehicle we use. * 
 
OT2. Training is received in a timely manner when new procedures are introduced. 
 
OT3. My organization provides realistic training that prepares us for the high-stress 
environment we operate in. 
 
OT4. Training is received at regular intervals to refresh and update knowledge. 
 
OT5. There is an effective training program for all new employees. 
 
* OT1 was deemed a double barreled question and subsequently broken into separate 
questions for equipment and vehicles for the validation study. 
 
Sub-dimension: vehicles and equipment 
OVE1. The vehicles we are provided are in good working order. 
 
OVE2. We are provided the appropriate vehicles to get the job done in the safest manner. 
 
OVE3. The vehicles we are provided are maintained to the highest safety standards. 
 
Group-level safety climate (GSC) 
 
Sub-dimension: management commitment and coworker support 
GMCS1. My work-shift supervisor (e.g., shift foreman, shift lead for flight or section if 
in an AMS) enforces safety rules and procedures (use of spotters, chocking 
vehicles, seat belt use, etc.). 
 
GMCS2. My work-shift supervisor (e.g., shift foreman, shift lead for flight or section if 
in an AMS) quickly corrects any unsafe behavior, even if it did not result in an 
accident. 
 
GMCS3. Coworkers in my workgroup ensure everyone uses the appropriate safety 
equipment for the job (e.g., hearing protection, gloves, and fall protection). 
 
GMCS4. Coworkers in my workgroup expect other workers to behave safely. 
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Sub-dimension: work pressure 
GWP1. I am encouraged to work faster, rather than by the rules whenever workload 
builds up. 
 
GWP2. I feel rushed to complete a task if I am behind schedule. 
 
GWP3. Punishment for missing a schedule of event (e.g., delaying an aircraft) is more 
severe than punishment for working unsafely. 
 
Sub-dimension: safety briefings 
GSB1. Recent safety-related events (e.g., injuries and accidents) are incorporated into 
safety briefings. 
 
GSB2. Personal experiences are used to help strengthen safety briefings. 
 
GSB3. Safety briefings are engaging enough to keep members of my workgroup 
interested. 
 
B.1 Paper 2 Questionnaire Scale Items 
 Respondents were asked to indicate on a scale from 1-7 the extent to which they 
agreed or disagreed with the following scale items.  The scale anchors were:  1 (strongly 
disagree), 2 (disagree), 3 (slightly disagree), 4 (neither agree nor disagree), 5 (slightly 
agree), 6 (agree), and 7 (strongly agree).   
 
Organization-level safety climate (OSC) 
 
Sub-dimension: management commitment to safety 
OMC1. Top management in my organization (squadron-level leadership) places safety 
over mission accomplishment. 
 
OMC2. Top management in my organization (squadron-level leadership) does not mind 
if an aircraft is delayed if it is due to safety. 
 
OMC3. Top management in my organization (squadron-level leadership) is strict about 
working safely even if work falls behind schedule. 
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Sub-dimension: safety policies and procedures 
OSP1. Current safety rules are easy to understand. 
 
OSP2. Current safety rules help keep me safe (e.g., double hearing protection, use of 
spotters). 
 
OSP3. Current safety procedures reflect how the job is actually performed. 
 
Sub-dimension: safety training 
OST1. My organization provides thorough training on every piece of equipment we use. 
 
OST2. My organization provides thorough training on every vehicle we use. 
 
OST3. Training is received in a timely manner when new procedures are introduced. 
 
OST4. My organization provides realistic training that prepares us for the high-stress 
environment we operate in. 
 
OST5. Training is received at regular intervals to refresh and update knowledge. 
 
OST6. There is an effective training program for all new employees. 
 
Sub-dimension: vehicles and equipment 
OVE1. The vehicles we are provided are in good working order. 
 
OVE2. We are provided the appropriate vehicles to get the job done in the safest manner. 
 
OVE3. The vehicles we are provided are maintained to the highest safety standards. 
 
Group-level safety climate (GSC) 
 
Sub-dimension: management commitment and coworker support 
My work-shift supervisor: 
GMCS1. My work-shift supervisor (e.g., shift foreman, shift lead for flight or section if 
in an AMS) enforces safety rules and procedures (use of spotters, chocking 
vehicles, seat belt use, etc.). 
 
GMCS2. My work-shift supervisor (e.g., shift foreman, shift lead for flight or section if 
in an AMS) quickly corrects any unsafe behavior, even if it did not result in an 
accident. 
 
GMCS3. Coworkers in my workgroup ensure everyone uses the appropriate safety 
equipment for the job (e.g., hearing protection, gloves, and fall protection). 
 
GMCS4. Coworkers in my workgroup expect other workers to behave safely. 
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Sub-dimension: work pressure 
GWP1. I am encouraged to work faster, rather than by the rules whenever workload 
builds up. 
 
GWP2. I feel rushed to complete a task if I am behind schedule. 
 
GWP3. Punishment for missing a schedule of event (e.g., delaying an aircraft) is more 
severe than punishment for working unsafely. 
 
Sub-dimension: safety briefings 
GSB1. Recent safety-related events (e.g., injuries and accidents) are incorporated into 
safety briefings. 
 
GSB2. Personal experiences are used to help strengthen safety briefings. 
 
GSB3. Safety briefings are engaging enough to keep members of my workgroup 
interested. 
 
Organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs) 
 
Sub-dimension: helping behavior 
HB1. I help out members of my workgroup if they fall behind in their work. 
 
HB2. I willingly share my expertise with other members of my workgroup. 
 
HB3. I try to act like a peacemaker when other members of my workgroup have 
disagreements. 
 
HB4. I take steps to try to prevent problems with other members of my workgroup. 
 
HB5. I willingly give my time to help members of my workgroup who have work-related 
problems. 
 
HB6. I "touch base" with other members of my workgroup before initiating actions that 
might affect them. 
 
HB7. I encourage other members of my workgroup when they are feeling down. 
 
Sub-dimension: civic virtue 
CV1. I provide constructive suggestions about how my workgroup can improve its 
effectiveness.  
 
CV2. I am willing to risk disapproval to express my beliefs about what’s best for my 
workgroup. 
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CV3. I attend and actively participate in team meetings. 
 
Sub-dimension: sportsmanship 
OCBS1. I always focus on what is wrong with our situation, rather than what is right. 
 
OCBS2. I spend a lot of time complaining about trivial matters. 
 
OSBS3. I always find fault with what other members of my workgroup are doing. 
 
Individual operational performance 
IP1. I adequately complete assigned duties. 
 
IP2. I fulfill responsibilities specified in my job description. 
 
IP3. I perform tasks that are expected of me. 
 
IP4. I meet formal performance requirements of the job. 
 
IP5. I engage in activities that will directly affect my performance evaluations. 
 
Impression management 
SD1. I sometimes tell lies if I have to. 
 
SD2. I never cover up my mistakes. 
 
SD3. There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone. 
 
SD4. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget. 
 
SD5. I have said something bad about a friend behind his/her back. 
 
SD6. When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening. 
 
SD7. I never take things that don’t belong to me. 
 
SD8. I don’t gossip about other people’s business. 
 
C.1 Paper 3 Questionnaire Scale Items 
 Respondents were asked to indicate on a scale from 1-7 the extent to which they 
agreed or disagreed with the following scale items.  The scale anchors were:  1 (strongly 
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disagree), 2 (disagree), 3 (slightly disagree), 4 (neither agree nor disagree), 5 (slightly 
agree), 6 (agree), and 7 (strongly agree).   
Organization-level safety climate (OSC) 
 
Sub-dimension: management commitment to safety 
OMC1. Top management in my organization (squadron-level leadership) places safety 
over mission accomplishment. 
 
OMC2. Top management in my organization (squadron-level leadership) does not mind 
if an aircraft is delayed if it is due to safety. 
 
OMC3. Top management in my organization (squadron-level leadership) is strict about 
working safely even if work falls behind schedule. 
 
Sub-dimension: safety policies and procedures 
OSP1. Current safety rules are easy to understand. 
 
OSP2. Current safety rules help keep me safe (e.g., double hearing protection, use of 
spotters). 
 
OSP3. Current safety procedures reflect how the job is actually performed. 
 
Sub-dimension: safety training 
OST1. My organization provides thorough training on every piece of equipment we use. 
 
OST2. My organization provides thorough training on every vehicle we use. 
 
OST3. Training is received in a timely manner when new procedures are introduced. 
 
OST4. My organization provides realistic training that prepares us for the high-stress 
environment we operate in. 
 
OST5. Training is received at regular intervals to refresh and update knowledge. 
 
OST6. There is an effective training program for all new employees. 
 
Sub-dimension: vehicles and equipment 
OVE1. The vehicles we are provided are in good working order. 
 
OVE2. We are provided the appropriate vehicles to get the job done in the safest manner. 
 
OVE3. The vehicles we are provided are maintained to the highest safety standards. 
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Group-level safety climate (GSC) 
 
Sub-dimension: management commitment and coworker support 
My work-shift supervisor: 
GMCS1. My work-shift supervisor (e.g., shift foreman, shift lead for flight or section if 
in an AMS) enforces safety rules and procedures (use of spotters, chocking 
vehicles, seat belt use, etc.). 
 
GMCS2. My work-shift supervisor (e.g., shift foreman, shift lead for flight or section if 
in an AMS) quickly corrects any unsafe behavior, even if it did not result in an 
accident. 
 
GMCS3. Coworkers in my workgroup ensure everyone uses the appropriate safety 
equipment for the job (e.g., hearing protection, gloves, and fall protection). 
 
GMCS4. Coworkers in my workgroup expect other workers to behave safely. 
 
Sub-dimension: work pressure 
GWP1. I am encouraged to work faster, rather than by the rules whenever workload 
builds up. 
 
GWP2. I feel rushed to complete a task if I am behind schedule. 
 
GWP3. Punishment for missing a schedule of event (e.g., delaying an aircraft) is more 
severe than punishment for working unsafely. 
 
Sub-dimension: safety briefings 
GSB1. Recent safety-related events (e.g., injuries and accidents) are incorporated into 
safety briefings. 
 
GSB2. Personal experiences are used to help strengthen safety briefings. 
 
GSB3. Safety briefings are engaging enough to keep members of my workgroup 
interested. 
 
Joint Management System 
 
Sub-dimension: process focus  
JMSPF1. The jobs I perform are well defined. 
 
JMSPF2. The jobs I perform can only be done one right way. 
 
JMSPF3. I am given standardized process instructions (e.g., checklists and technical 
orders) for the jobs I perform. 
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JMSPF4. Before a new job is started, the best way to do it is defined. 
 
Sub-dimension: Monitoring, hazard control, and communication 
JMSHC1. We continuously monitor our production system (defined as vehicles, 
equipment, machines, division of labor, workflow, and information flow) to 
ensure that safety risks are reduced or eliminated. 
 
JMSHC2. We have a system in place to identify risks in all jobs. 
 
JMSHC3. Identified risks have been documented. 
 
JMSHC4. The identified risks have been prioritized. 
 
JMSHC5. Strategies have been created to reduce or eliminate all identified risks. 
 
JMSHC6. Management frequently communicates to workers how the organization is 
meeting safety goals. 
 
JMSHC7. Management frequently communicates to workers how the organization is 
making safety improvements. 
 
JMSHC8. Management frequently communicates to workers about the key safety 
priorities of the organization. 
 
Operational performance 
OP1. I adequately complete assigned duties. 
 
OP2. I fulfill responsibilities specified in my job description. 
 
OP3. I perform tasks that are expected of me. 
 
OP4. I meet formal performance requirements of the job. 
 
OP5. I engage in activities that will directly affect my performance evaluations. 
 
Safety Behaviors 
SB1. I ignore safety regulations to get the job done. 
 
SB2. I take chances to get the job done. 
 
SB3. I bend the rules to achieve a target. 
 
SB4. I get the job done better by ignoring some rules. 
 
SB5. I take shortcuts which involve little or no risk. 
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